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THREE WINDOWS INTO REALITY*

THERE are many aspects as there are many approaches to reality. It matters little with what self-consistent or rational theory we approach nature, she is certain to answer back in kind with some knowledge. All approaches have to be made, however, through the experiences of human consciousness; and all, however varied in result, are stamped with the hallmark of the interpreter. It may well be a source of wonder that with such diverse fundamental assumptions nature should appear so accommodating in informing us, but not if we reflect upon the fact that the human mind itself is a part of that nature which it essays to interpret. As itself a product of nature its normal workings insure its capacity to achieve some truth no matter by what means or in what direction it seeks. In the realm of human thought we are never free from its implications, and when all is said and done can never be more sure of our universe than we are of ourselves, of our own existence, of the validity of our own experience. Many men have pretended to escape the shadow of their own minds to find refuge in some Absolute, but in vain. Neither the Absolutes of space, time, or matter, with which the scientist has hitherto beguiled himself, nor the Absolute Idea or Reason of the philosopher, nor the infallibilities of revelation of a divine Absolute by which the theologian has driven home his dogma; none of these has cleared itself of this fateful "shadow that walks by him still", the necessity for individual judgment. Each in its own field has at one time or another laid exclusive claim to enlightenment. Each has been at some time denied by the others. Let us discuss these various aspects of the approach to reality, for truths appear to be of

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many kinds. There are facts of the material world as substantial at least as the rock by which Doctor Johnson in contemptuous misunderstanding disproved the philosophy of Bishop Berkeley; there are facts which Plotinus declared to provide the field of philosophy, "the things that matter most"; and there are facts like righteousness, love, and self-sacrifice, in the tenuous-considered realm of religion, which however immaterial have changed the direction and aspirations of human society and of individuals without number.

As to reality, the standpoint of this paper shall be the pragmatic one that anything is real which may be said to make a discernible difference. Whatever falls outside this falls outside our human purview.

One frequently overlooked factor in such discussions must be set forward as the starting dogma in all fields, unproved, undemonstrable as some think of demonstration, and received by faith. That dogma and that faith are namely this, that we assume the validity of human intelligence and the intelligibility of what any of us may call reality.

I. THE WINDOW OF SCIENCE

Science approaches reality through the medium of temporal and spatial measurement. This is a legitimate limitation of its field which science makes in the interest of clarity. It asks the question what may we know of physical reality about us from the standpoint of physical relations and measurements. It should not be condemned for sticking to its field and keeping silence with respect to philosophy and religion. Like both philosophy and religion, it starts with an essential dogma or dogmas. It assumes first the intelligibility of the world it seeks to know, assuming at a stroke the whole problem of epistemology. The second dogma is a metaphysical one. It assumes the existence of universal laws of nature, which renders it particularly vulnerable in face of any examples of contingency. Both these scientific dogmas, we now discover, are under fire within the ranks of the scientists themselves, who for the first time in scientific history have felt called upon to examine their primary assumptions. Science now shows dissatisfaction with its former dogmas as in its examination of the atom it trembles precariously on the brink of metaphysics. Perhaps the

best defence that may be made in the future for these unprovable scientific dogmas will be like the best defence of philosophical and theological dogmas, the pragmatic one, true according to their practical values.

Under the circumstances of its own limitations we cannot expect science on the physical basis to yield us anything more than physical explanation. Its method is measurement, its tool is mathematics; and its test is predictability of physical events. So long as it remains within its own avowed field, science, both in methods and results, is above all criticism from either philosophy or religion. Neither can it be placed on trial for its demonstrated findings. Whoever falls upon this rock will be broken to pieces. The main criticisms of science arise when it goes outside its field, forgets the limitations under which it has chosen to work, and without philosophical acumen or religious insight adopts the unjustifiable dogma that no reality exists outside of its own prescribed limits or can be disclosed except to its methods. Such an assertion is not only dogmatic but likewise arrogant, and has brought some scientists into just and well-earned disrepute. Here their scientific fulminations are on a par with those of the philosophic subjectivist or of the theological intuitionist who denounces scientific facts.

Science meets with three insuperable difficulties, which are respectively the metaphysical, the epistemological, and the religious. In the case of metaphysics, if the scientist assumes the autonomy of nature, his mechanistic explanation cannot hold since he posits an inner magic by which the unique 'emerges', *i.e.*, $2 + 2 = 5$. Such an assumption cannot be considered explanatory. An autonomous nature is not one that achieves results by reaction to external forces alone. On the question of epistemology he is even more at sea. Science has done and can do nothing to clear up the field of how we must think reality in the physical world. The more it has actually discovered about physical reality the less certain has it been of the terms under which it could describe it, until now we have the open confession that its present descriptions of ultimate reality are only imaginative attempts at picturing certain experiences, or what more recent physics might be inclined to describe as unpicturable notions of the understanding. On the third count science has failed to tell us anything about "the things that matter

most", so that if we were to miss the whole of scientific reality we should still remain in secure possession of the things most worth while for human life.

Under these circumstances the present modesty of science is fitting, and in striking contrast to the claims made for it by its less enlightened members or its philosophical camp-followers. This is not to depreciate its values nor to deny its facts, but simply to call attention to the limitations of the space-time phenomena which provide the charter under which it has chosen to work. Since in its world of investigation it has elected sometimes boastfully to act as if the spectator did not exist, it is now embarrassed by a world in which the spectator must be considered a factor.

II. THE WINDOW OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy will not universally be granted to be a window from which we may look out upon or into reality. Certainly not by any such as deny the validity of values or cast doubt upon the operations of the human mind. That this is so must be held to be largely the fault of the materialistic and naturalistic philosophers who for some time past have been industriously engaged in sawing off the philosophical limb on which they are sitting.

It must perhaps be admitted that we have happened upon a time when the market for rational coherence, the demand for reason, is at the lowest ebb. The man of the street seems in some way to imagine that humbug can furnish a platform for success, and his credulity regarding irrational measures verges on the pathetic. For this he can scarcely be blamed when even in the seats of philosophy there has been so much depreciation of systematic thinking, so much encouragement given to fragmentary self-cancelling concepts.

Philosophy, like science, starts with the dogma of the intelligibility of the real. It presumes that the outlook, previous education, prejudice, of the observer make a difference with the observer's concept of reality. Philosophy therefore believes that we should apply the test of coherence to our concepts. This is done, of course, on the assumption of a coherent universe after the manner of science's universal law. The philosopher proposes to approach reality from the standpoint of what is coherent, unless indeed he be altogether a sceptic. The only real charter he has for such an

approach lies in the assumption which the scientist had previously left out of his, namely, the existence of the spectator as himself a portion of the phenomena of nature needing also to be accounted for. Since the interpreting mind is a portion of nature he declares himself on the dogma that science has often assumed without question, namely, that the intelligent mind truly apprehends an intelligible reality. In other words, he bases the intelligibility of nature on intelligence in man, or *vice versa*. Both man and nature arising from the same source and forming a part of the same process cannot be in fundamental contradiction or disagreement. If this be true, coherence then has a meaning and provides a ground for philosophical speculation.

It may be said that this approach is purely epistemological and in no way involves metaphysics. Reflection will show however that our answer to the problems of thought will depend upon our metaphysical assumption. Is the external world amenable to thought or does it simply produce thought on the empty tablet of the mind? This is of course the crucial question in philosophy. If we adopt the first alternative we have still a charter for philosophy; if the second we have none, since the spectator is again left out of the picture. This conclusion will not be obvious to either absolutist or monist, since each is habituated to a living with certain inconsistencies. The first is committed to a divine experience out of keeping with the divine character, faced by the problem of evil; the second with the problem of error. He is set about to explain disagreements in understanding that are caused by the same basic experiences.

III. THE WINDOW OF RELIGION

The average person of intelligence is not satisfied with seeing the world of reality through the windows of science and philosophy alone. Even the most rabid opponents of religion, instead of neglecting what they declare to be a myth, a superstition, an ultimate futility, spend a great deal of time and energy in reiteration of what, if their theories were true, would be obvious to all. Yet they are called upon to battle daily against these spectres that never down. The average man is convinced that so far he has been scientifically shown not more than half of the world of

reality, and that for him it is the least important half. He sees certain great values that are not measurable by sense arithmetic, certain facts that are more than simple knowledge; these are those deeper facts for which and by which he lives.

Thus the inquiring mind is inevitably, whether for or against, brought into the field of religion. If *for* it, he can justly claim to be talking about reality; if *against* it he can only make the negative excuse that he is willing to talk about nothing but a persistent and pernicious illusion. To the normal man the supreme realities of life spring from love, loyalty, honesty, integrity, altruism, high-mindedness, fortitude, reverence for what is greater or better than one's self, duty, obligation, social responsibility, respect for the rights of others, faith in the practicability and value of the good life, confidence in the friendliness of the universe, and an utter devotion of one's powers to the life of values. All these one acknowledges as religious without claiming them to be a complete definition of religion. These form the field of religion, of all religions alike. This will, of course, be violently denied by such as are habituated to slur religion as only the escape-mechanism of such as fear hell-fire. As a matter of fact, there is no religion where there is not love of values for themselves. Wherever there is love of these values in a man, however much protesting his irreligion, there is religion. However faulty in accomplishment, however perverse in methods, the aim of religion everywhere is the same, the cultivation of the good life as the supremely worthwhile reality.

Men have discovered that to this end the assertion of a dogma gets the best results. As the scientist proceeds on the undemonstrable dogma of universal law, even though it be of statistics, and the mathematician on the elusive dogma of infinite divisibility, convenient mental fictions as Vaihinger calls them, so the religionist assumes a universe in which moral and spiritual values matter, are at home. He symbolizes this concept under the term God, believing that these values are the highest form of reality. The test here again is a pragmatic one. If it turns out that devotion to these higher concepts or values leads to a better life, to a larger achievement of those values, to a growing appreciation of them, then he is justified in his belief in God. The cogency of this belief is denied

by some who do not see that fundamentally theism is a confidence in the moral nature of the universe. If we resort to the scientific expedient of statistical verification, we shall, I think, have to admit that for the general run of men the concept of God is of supreme pragmatic value. It is simply a working proposition in an endeavor for a good life, and should be applauded by every lover of mankind.

We have here a field of reality which is and cannot be proved or disproved by scientific measurement. Index pointers of emotional psychology can be here of little avail, because they can speak only of intensity of physical reactions and have nothing at all to say of moral quality or value. We have not invented a pointer that can distinguish between love and hate, or indicate the mental and spiritual sources of the aberrations behind the needle of the lie-detector. Neither can these values be said to lie mainly in the field of rationality; for here we are in the region of paradox. Such paradoxes as these are common: the presence of extreme physical suffering with extreme joy as in the martyrs; the concomitance of external shame with inner self-assurance; the sense of external loss with the assurance of inner gain. Here we have the whole realm of tragedy as represented in art and music. Why does the darkness of the background in the picture bring satisfaction by exposing the highlights? Why do the minors and even the discords in the music bring a satisfying fulness of expression, without which our minds grope unsatisfied? It is because in the region of values the paradoxical finds expression which neither scientific measurement nor philosophical coherence can deal with. One has to be endowed with a point of view, a platform of appreciation, a power of insight, to press through the world of casual appearances to the deeper reality. At this point, the fact that the believer in the phenomena of external senses alone, or in rationality alone, can say to me 'I do not see it' has no weight at all. He is like the man used as an illustration recently by one of my mechanistic colleagues who criticized the person who hoped to get the reality of the oil-painting only by rubbing his nose against it. The nose-rubbing order of scientist and philosopher is apt to miss altogether the very meaning of religion.

The conclusion of these considerations might be summarized

in certain likenesses and differences found in the exponents of the three realms of reality. All are compelled to make the fundamental assumption of the intelligibility of the universe. Each sets before itself a goal which is inconsistent with its present achievement and which if taken literally could only be considered preposterous. These are the various absolutes, the conventional mental fictions by which we are enabled to advance. With science, of course, it is an absolute space-time world of universal law and predictability; with philosophy it is absolute truth or logical coherence, with religion an absolute person or God. All these terms are obviously unattainable or unintelligible to a space-time-bound creature such as man. On the other hand, if he were altogether the creature of space and time such questions could not torment him.

Each has at times claimed for itself exclusive insights into reality; and yet each leaves its devotees inwardly unsatisfied by reason of a consciousness that something has by this claim of exclusiveness been left out of the picture. For this reason each has attempted to go beyond its fundamental assumptions, to speak for the others, to condemn conclusions it considered inconsistent with its own. It is as if three groups of children playing at three windows should claim their own perspective to be the only true one and that their view could be maintained only by denying all others. This situation arises from the fact that reality is approached by three distinct methods, each of which is legitimate for the realities it seeks but can arrive only at such realities as lie legitimately within the scope of its method. In the use of its method there is a necessary orientation if there is to be understanding. This has led to a certain cocksureness by the employer of a given method and to contempt by proponents of the other two realms. Orientation, mathematical and observational, is necessary to the scientist. With the philosopher it is logical and dialectical; with the religionist it is an insight into spiritual values and realities that require an orientation. The trouble arises from the fact that, however much we trichotomize our world for purposes of observation, the division is only academic and none of us can be exclusively scientific, exclusively philosophical, or exclusively religious. We are looking at one reality under three aspects, the better to appraise it.

There is no point therefore to the claim that our opponent has

not grasped reality because it doesn't fall in with our own scientific, or philosophic, or religious approach. There is no value to our prejudice toward each other. No one can consistently hold that truths in one realm are at war with truth in another without abrogating his own fundamental thesis. How futile then it is for either philosophy or religion to catch at the coat-tails of passing scientific methods, or for science to deny religious facts because they cannot be measured and weighed, or for religion to anathematize science or philosophy. We should fit the method to the field of inquiry. Logical coherence is not to be judged by time-space measurement, nor are the upward reaches of the soul after a new life in God to be condemned as unreal because they are neither altogether coherent nor space-filling.

However various the methods by which we approach reality, there is one inevitable factor in all which has been resolutely overlooked. However much science, in the interest of complete disinterestedness, may have desired a universe without a spectator, "himself from self he could not free". The same fact has beset the most perfect syllogism of the philosopher. Coherence is ever relative to himself. The absolutes of religion have after all been something less than absolute in the understandings and interpretation of very human and fallible individuals. Each man in the last analysis sees and interprets the world through his own experience. And here he will see and understand the most, who keeps open and clean the windows of his own soul with a minimum of arrogance regarding his own understanding, not denying the understanding of others but anxious to profit by whatever of value they may bring.

To the wise man in search of reality nothing human can be alien.

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HISTORY AS THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL VALUES*

"All experience is an arch wherethro'
Gleams that untravell'd world, whose margin fades
For ever and for ever when I move."—Tennyson, *Ulysses*

I. INTRODUCTORY

BOSANQUET says that "History is a hybrid form of experience incapable of any considerable degree of being or true-ness".¹ "It is intermediate between the abstract and partial views of the whole which science traffics in, and the view of the concrete and the whole which Philosophy seeks."² Consequently, Time is an appearance inseparable from the membership of finiteness in infinity. "Time is the self-revelation of a reality which, as a whole is timeless." I cannot accept this notion of Time and History. For me all actual experience is historical. It involves always the givenness of process. I cannot make head or tail of any reality apart from process. A timelessly absolute whole to me means nothing. The only non-temporal factors that I find are in the formal principles of structures and processes. Real existence is individuated. Of course, in a purely formal sense any judgment—such as that here and now I am speaking—has a timeless aspect; it is timelessly true. But if someone says tomorrow, 'Leighton spoke last night at the banquet', that true statement will be true in a different setting. It will not be timeless. The argument of some idealists, that to be conscious of before and after is to transcend time, is a fallacy of equivocation. So long as I continue to be self-conscious of course I shall continue to be self-conscious, but no longer.

On the other hand, the purely immanent humanistic idealism of Croce and Gentile seems to me equally erroneous in its identification of history with philosophy and of human history with reality. They overlook entirely the brute givenness of the natural environment which powerfully conditions the acts and passions of human beings. Since, for Croce, Reality is the ceaseless Becoming, through self-activity, of the human spirit, and this spirit has no Transcend-

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¹ Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, 78 ff.

² *Ibid.*, 33 f.

ent Source or Background, but is simply the concrete life of humanity, Croce's philosophy is a purely immanent humanism; and philosophy is for him identical with history. Nothing really valuable is lost. What is preserved and enriched in the course of history is history itself, 'spirituality'. The subject of true history is the *eternal present*, ever renewing and developing and enriching itself from age to age. History is not the work of nature, nor of an extra-mundane God, nor of the empirical and unreal individual, but is the work of that individual which is truly real and is the eternal spirit individualizing itself. Since the essence of spirit is to realize the values of life by self-activity, all history is charged with values; it is the endless individualization of the universal. And, for example, the subject of the history of poetry is the universal, *poetry*; of social history, *civilization, progress, liberty*, or any other similar word—that is to say, a *universal*. Social history arranges the chroniclistic chaos of events in ordered series of history's social values. Nothing exists but general history.

But what of Nature as the environing and conditioning theatre of history? For Croce, nature is the product of abstraction by spirit for practical purposes, the field of *pseudo-concepts*. There is no unity of scientific method or principles. Nature, devoid of consciousness, is nothing but the abstract mechanizing, classifying function of the human spirit. Croce out-Fichtes Fichte here. I cannot see how any well balanced thinker can hold such a position. A spiritual immanentism, based on such a jejune notion of nature, seems to me a disappearing wraith. It takes all the guts and muscles out of humanity and leaves a ghost.

The mystic may mean something when he speaks of our noisy years being moments in the being of the eternal silence, but I do not know what he means. To me, Eternity could mean only the perduration, through endless process, of an enduring self-activity. If Absolutism means the doctrine of an all-swallowing timeless supernal Being, I am not an absolutist.

II. THE CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

In the widest sense of the term, history includes all *processes*, physical and vital. But I am using it here only in the sense of *human* history. In this inclusive sense, it is applied to three quite

different things. First, to the existing records of the past; second, to the human compositions which express the interpretations of the records (historiography); and third, to the succession of events which are constructed by the process of interpretation and projected on the dark backward and abysm of time. Thus, in a broad sense, all history is contemporaneous, and all cultural groups and historical-minded members thereof are their own historians.

There are three principal factors in the making of history. There is, first, *the physical world*, the brute given environment of human life. The physical environment, of course, has its vicissitudes. From a human point of view, there are physical contingencies that are episodic, such as floods, droughts, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. There are long-range contingencies, such as the desiccation of a region which leads to the ruin of a culture. And, of course, it is possible that, in the minute elements of the physical order, absolute chance occurs. But, on the whole, a primary culture develops in a physical environment that is relatively stable.

The second factor in the making of history is the givenness of life and sentience, with all its variety of impulses, needs, interests, strivings, from the simplest unicellular organisms to the human animal. This *biotic given* is more complex and more plastic than the physical given. If biological evolution be true, then the plasticity of life has been very considerable.

The third factor in the making of history is the *spirit* in man. I include in this term the social feelings, the esthetic, the imaginative, and the intellectual powers. I use the term 'spirit' rather than 'mind', as being more inclusive; and unless otherwise qualified, I always mean by 'spirit' actual spirit—*individuated spirit*.

By history, then, I mean here the social resultant of the complex interplay of man's biotic and spiritual powers with the physical environment. This resultant is a *social culture*. Social cultures arise through the coöperations and conflicts of members of social groups aiming at the satisfaction of biotic needs and spiritual cravings—self-preservation, reproduction, and emotional development and self-satisfaction. In a broad sense it is true that, while the philosopher talks, hunger and love rule the world; but it is hunger and love regulated and sublimated by social patterns gener-

ated through invention, reflection, and imaginative musings communicated by one individual to his fellows, and by them adopted and modified. The records show a plurality of social cultures; but it does not follow, as Spengler maintained, that every culture is a mystical millennial organism that is mysteriously born, and runs its destiny-determined career to old age and death. Spengler ignores the borrowings, the diffusions, the cross-fertilizations, the mergings of cultures. For example, although we do not yet know very much about the careers of the various Indian cultures of Central and South America, it is clear that there were contacts, borrowings, and mergings in this region that went on for many centuries before the destructive advent of the Spaniards. Moreover, the Spaniards did not quite accomplish the destruction of the native cultures. The esthetic patterns and, even, to some extent, the social and economical relationships of the native Mexican cultures have persisted to this day, and now seem to be having a renaissance.

Before I take up the specific features of human culture, I must clear the way by repudiating the assumption that the historical processes of culture can be fitted, without remainder, into the framework of any general formula for cosmic evolution. In recent and contemporary philosophy three comprehensive formulas of this sort have been offered. First, Herbert Spencer's unilinear theory of evolutionary progress; second, Bergson's theory; and third, the theory of emergent evolution. We may call these respectively the unilinear-ascent theory, the jumpy theory, and the step-wise pyramidal theory. Spencer, for example, starting out with his axiomatic principles, *the instability of the homogeneous, the conservation of force, and the segregation of effects*—and applying his general formula of evolutionary progress—demonstrated, to his own satisfaction, that the fundamental social laws in the period of industrialization are the increase of decentralization and peaceful coöperation. At the very time when Spencer was publishing his ponderous sociology and ethics, industrialism was moving swiftly towards increased centralization, class-conflict, and international conflict.

According to Bergson, the life-process struck out along the path first of the plants and the plant-like animals. Then, threatened with

being engulfed by the downward current of materiality, it took a fresh toe-hold and evolved instinct. Then instinct facing the relentless downward drag of matter, the vital impetus by a mighty effort struck out intelligence and began to invent tools; and now, since the tools, which the vital impetus has made, threaten to turn men, their makers, into robots, the vital impetus must take another toe-hold and dilate instinct into intuition.

I have four criticisms of Bergson's theory. (1) He rates too highly the accuracy of instinct. (2) His conception of intelligence is a caricature. (3) He does not give any comprehensible hint as to how Western man is to solve his problems today by intuition. (4) I think his pure duration and pure memory are mythical.

The step-wise pyramidal emergent theory of Alexander and others seems more plausible; but, after all, what is 'emergence' except a name for the historical succession of novel configurations, new dynamic structures or forms, with new qualities? Alexander has not shown how richer qualified levels emerge from lower qualified levels. He says that the new level could not be predicted, even by an omniscient intelligence, from the configuration of the level just below. Nevertheless, the new level could be expressed, *without remainder*, in terms of the level next below. Alexander has to pack into the *Nisus* whatever he is going to produce from his conjurer's hat at the critical moment. Furthermore, there may be *demergent devolution*, as well as emergent evolution. If a Jurassic monster should come back today it might bemoan the degeneration of the earth since the day its kind flourished, and lament the rule of the little featherless biped who is now so prodigally wasting the earth's resources and his own offspring.

I do not see any persuasive way, except by a verbal conjuring trick, of getting a world of teeming individuality and diversity of structure out of a featureless simplicity, without first concealing in the simplicity the complexity that is to emerge. Nor do I see that the principle of *Concrescence* does the trick. In the first place, I find no explanation of why or how the Platonic realm of "eternal objects" begins its ingression into a world of events, nor how or why there should arise a whole world of organisms aiming at more subjectivity, some of whom do not behave at all like organisms, and all of whom *feel*; although most of them cannot feel their

own feelings or communicate with organisms that do have the powers of sentient awareness and reflection. A non-communicating soul or mind is nonsense to me. Panpsychism and panorganicism are sheer speculations that throw no light on the *structural qualitative differences in the data of actual experience*.

Briefly, my epistemological standpoint is as follows: I have experience. In experience I distinguish between the experiencing self and the non-self. I cannot be aware of my experience, without also in principle being aware that it is mine, and distinguishing between my awareness and the data. In both poles, namely in my *experiencing* and the *experienced*, I am aware of some continuity and much change. Now different parts of my sense data behave quite differently. Over some parts I have considerable control, and, also, there is a doubleness in my awareness of them. For example, I feel a sensation of heaviness in my leg; I move it and pinch it and it wakes up, so that I say that is part of my bodily self. Other parts of my sense-data I can more or less control by planned effort and with tools. I can move a stone by using a lever, but the stone resists and does not communicate its feelings or views to me; so I say it consists of inorganic stuff. Other groups of my sense data I cannot control in the same way. If I try to use a crowbar or even a pin on them I get a very painful reaction. But I can communicate with these other groups of sense data by language; so I say there are probably minds like mine inside them. Other groups of sense data I communicate with more imperfectly, my dog, for example. It is a confusion of boundaries in the empirical behaviors manifested in the empirically different clusters of sense data, to attempt to reduce them to common terms. *Anything is what it does*; and these various groups behave differently. I hold that mentalism or panpsychism, pan-organicism and materialism, either crude or refined, are all *Machtsprüche* that get us nowhere.

III. THE UNIQUENESS OF HISTORY

History is a unique field of data for the philosopher. The processes of history are the processes of history. They cannot be reduced to any mathematized or logicized metaphysic, based on physical science. The principles for historical interpretation must be found in the *interest-seeking, value-striving, unique nature of*

man. Man is both a biotic and a spiritual being—a spiritual animal. He is always a member of one or more groups or communities of persons. As such he lives in and by a system of socialized *interests* and *values*.

The specificity of human history forbids its being stretched out on any Procrustean bed of merely physical or physico-biological cosmological categories. The latter are too thin, too abstractedly universal, to do other than either distort, or omit entirely, significant features of man's historical culture. Psychology of the ultra-behavioristic type is irrelevant to the rich and variegated moving panorama of history. Granting that physical determination plays a large rôle in the shaping of cultures, and man's animal inheritance a larger rôle, it remains true that such categories as "struggle for existence" and even "adaptation to environment" do not take us far in the interpretation of cultures, and become misleading and distorting concepts when carried out in a doctrinaire fashion. History must be understood in terms of the specificity of man, and man in turn in terms of the specific rôle of social cultures. There is here an inevitable circularity. The more one understands the nature of man, the more is one able to enter into the meanings and values of diverse cultures; and the more one understands the meanings of cultures, the more one understands man. There is great need for a genuinely historical and philosophical anthropology which would be based, not principally on the study of the peaceful Arafuras and the bloody Dyaks, but primarily on a comparative understanding of high-grade cultures. Such an anthropology would avoid the artificial simplification of human capacities and motivations which results from riding to death some abstraction derived from either physics, biology, a naturalistic positivism, or a jejune idealism. It would start from experience in its living totality of perception, instinct or feeling, impulse, imagination, reflective analysis and synthesis, volition. It would take to heart the saying, *Die Theile habt Ihr in der Hand; Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band*.

Man lives not in one time but in several times. As an individual he has his own private time which I call *personal* time or *spirit* time. The individual lives his own history. This history is a function of the specious present. My past is actual only in so far as it functions in my living present, which is a pulse of becoming or-

ganized into a whole by the experienced continuity of myself. My future is also a function of my present. One may say without exaggeration that present, past, and future reciprocally determine one another in the end. My past functions in my present, determining it; and my future functions in my present, determining it, thus determining, too, the way in which my past is interpreted and used in my present. Impulsively and volitionally, in the specious present, I live forward. Reflectively, I live intelligently by using, in my specious present, the past.

The spirit or personal time is controlled by social time, a clock-time; but it is often difficult for the individual to adjust his spirit time with clock-time. For example, I repeatedly find that just as I have gotten well under way at some interesting matter, I have to arrest my activity because it is time to go to class; and then just as I have gotten the class interested, the bell strikes and we have to part.

There is a third time—cosmic or physical time, whatever that may be. I shall pass it by here by merely mentioning it.

It may be objected that there is no objective history to furnish data for the philosopher, since the so-called historical past is actual only in the living present of the community. The community, whether family, group, clan, tribe, or nation, interprets the records and writes history to suit itself. The Nazis go even further and say that not only is there only tribal history, that is preëminently national history and social philosophy of the Noble Aryans; but even only tribal science. The theory of relativity is a Jewish sophism. Now, of course, history is always being rewritten in the spirit of the time, of the tribe, of the nation, even of individuals who read and write history in all sorts of ways according to their own apprehensive systems. Every culture writes its own histories. These histories are the projections, into the past, of its own interests, prejudices, hopes and fears, and strivings; in short *its valuations*.

We do not, therefore, conclude that there are no large-scale patterns of human values, no trends, no progressions or regressions, in the historical life of man. Clearly, there are *historical continuants*—*patterns of social culture*—*values*, that arise and change in the historical processes. The various types of social institutions—family, clan, tribe, city-state, nation-state—are frameworks, within

which the accepted values of the groups live. There are the patterns for the regulation of manners, moralities, laws, and political institutions. There are the economic patterns, the technological patterns; there are the value-patterns of the fine arts, of science, philosophy, and religion. These cultural patterns constitute, in their totality, the whole culture of a group in a certain stretch of time. They are recorded in the records of the past. They function dynamically in the present, and they change. Cultures arise because man is both an animal, living in a given physical environment, and a spiritual culture-being. I use the phrase 'spiritual power' as the least misleading inclusive term for the distinctively human powers of observation, memory, analysis, and synthesis, in thought and imagination, sympathetic feeling, reflective choice, esthetic enjoyment, the quest for perfection and religious reverence. The categories for the interpretation of history are to be found in the effective *values* or *goods*, the realization of which is sought by a social culture. The social values have a rôle in the building of cultures, and therefore in the understanding of them, analogous to that which regularities in the operations of natural events have in physical science and technology. Moreover, physical science is the offspring of technology; and, since technology is a function of a community, physical science alone cannot dictate or guide man in the creation and improvement of the social condition of a good life. The good life is the end-product of the coöperation of the spiritual powers; therefore, it is the reversal of their direct order to attempt to explain spiritual powers in terms of a desiccated mathematized technology. It is a case of apotheosis of the instrument.

On the other hand, of course, there is always the danger of prostituting the spirit of objective inquiry to a conservative system of social values equipped with the instruments of terrorism and propaganda. This danger has become a terrifying reality in the totalitarian states. But the escape from it does not lie in proclaiming that all judgments or propositions concerning values are nonsense, since a proposition concerning value is only the statement of a solipsistic individual's emotive reaction. To make a concrete application, if there are no objectively valid ethical values, then, since the Nazis have the guns and the guts, in short the superior force, and their reactions are more effective, the logical positivist would be not

rational if he complained when he was put in a concentration camp or beheaded.

IV. VALUES AND PERSONALITY

All intrinsic values are aspects of personality-fulfillment. Defining 'Good' as the satisfaction of personality, all values are aspects of the 'Good'.

Values are subject-object relations. Generically, value is, as Mr. Perry puts it, "any object of any interest". Value always involves four factors. First, a subject; second, an object or an objective; third, the interest of the subject in the object or objective as promising the fulfillment of a value; fourth, a judgment by the subject that the interest is, or will be, fulfilled by the object or objective; or, in the case of disvalue, that the interest will be thwarted. By 'person' I mean always a reflective individual conscious of social relations.

Some hold that, while ethical, aesthetic and religious attitudes involve values or are forms of values, cognition is not a form of value.

Now cognition is always a subject-object relation, but it is contended that, since knowing is the universal condition of all values, it is presupposed by them and hence is not a value. If one says, 'This landscape is beautiful' or 'This act is good', the judgment seems two-faced. There is a cognition as well as a valuation, since it is implied that the object judged to be beautiful or good both exists and is qualified by value. And, on the other hand, we may value imaginary objects without implying their existence. Moreover, the values of cognition are not identical with the existence of its objects. The objects of cognition may have purely practical or instrumental values, ethical values, the values of logico-aesthetic contemplation, or be value-indifferent.

Against this argument I contend that all significant aesthetical and ethical judgments, no less than practical judgments, imply cognitive judgments. The most ideally imaginative object in the aesthetic or ethical field exists at least in a universe of imagination or intellection. The most abstruse logical and mathematical propositions exist in a universe of rational discourse. It may be "on the road to Xanadu", Shelley's "Intellectual Beauty", an imaginative

reconstruction of the culture of Periclean Athens, a devotee's imaged Christ or Buddha, an 'n'-dimensional universe. In every case it exists as an object in some universe of imagination or discourse.

A cognitive judgment is always motivated by interest. We do not judge unless we attend. The attention may be spontaneous or forced, and so the interest may be primary or derivative. The mind is always active in making any judgment. But, it is said, we have *presentations*, immediate feelings, which are below the level of judgment. My reply is: there is no question of valuation, nor of truth or falsehood, in such states of dumb feeling. Pure experience, so-called, or feeling, in which no distinction and no relation have arisen between subject and object, is no consciousness of any object or content by any subject; it is only a limiting case, which the knower may approach asymptotically but can never quite reach. To note an experience is to recognize it as distinct from, but tied up with, the acting of noting. As Alexander puts it, the *-ing* and the *-ed* are strictly correlative. This is true, no matter what the object or content be. Whether it is a sensuous object, a logical proposition, or one's own state of feeling, the correlativity of these dual aspects can never be transcended without transcending consciousness, nor can one get beneath them to a virginal experience without passing into unconsciousness, which is not experience.

While it is true that many objects of cognition may be almost entirely indifferent with respect to instrumental, aesthetic, or ethical qualities, potentially all have either instrumental or intrinsic value or disvalue. Sometimes beauty is truth, and sometimes ugliness is truth. Intellectual error, suffering, and moral evil, are also truth. Many truths are instrumentally useful. Others are instrumentally useless, but intrinsically valuable, because they satisfy my intellectual-aesthetic interest in contemplating the clean simplicity, comprehensiveness and harmony of pure thought; to me a clear-cut piece of reasoning, a wide embracing sweep of theory, are just as beautiful as a waterfall or a sunset. I deeply enjoy the intellectually breath-taking gyrations of the electron-theory, just as I enjoy the sublimity of a great mountain range or the Grand Canyon; and I do not care whether these theories have any practical use or not. Indeed, I sympathize with the great mathematician who said, after

demonstrating a brand new theorem: "There, thank God, is something for which no use will ever be found". That truth is otherwise useless does not mean that it is valueless. There are also harmful truths. White lies may be socially more useful than the brutal truth. But, it is objected, cognitive judgments have an objectivity, in the sense of universality, that other value-judgments do not have. And this is true. The most universal of all judgments are found in the propositions of pure logic and mathematics; these are the most universal because they consist of purely formal, non-existential definitions and implications which are expressions of the determinately structured activity of reason; and they have the universal and intrinsic value which belongs to the activity of pure reason. Moreover, they have instrumental value, since they are applicable in formulating systems of linked relationships in the processes of experience. Physical science seeks the maximal depersonalization of sense data. Its goal is to establish, as far as possible, invariant orders of functional relations in the similarities and repetition of sense data. From the standpoint of the postulates of physical science, contingency is ignorance on the part of the knower of some determinate functional relationship within the process of sensory events. From the standpoint of a monistic metaphysics of science, for example, Spinoza's or Bosanquet's, all finite causation, all determination of consequents by antecedents, is part of the boundless web of infinite causation.

Besides the compulsiveness of deductive systems of pure logic, we have the compulsiveness of the brute given on the minds receiving it. Applying the deductive system of logic and mathematics to the compulsory sense data, and formulating regularities in the procession of sense-data in economic shorthand concepts and formulas, we attain intellectual mastery thus far; and so verification by prediction becomes the best empirical test of scientific objectivity. But intellectual mastery and successful prediction are of the utmost practical value for man in his struggle with his environment and with himself, and, moreover, they have the intrinsic value of the self-realization of the human mind's increasingly adequate correspondence with its world.

Ethical and aesthetic judgments of value do not have this universal objectivity. Indeed, not even is there the same agreement

about smells and tastes, sounds and colors, less about the latter than about shapes and sizes; but there is more agreement about sense qualities in general than about aesthetic qualities. Perhaps there is nearly as much agreement about ethical qualities as about sense data.

The lack of objectivity, in the sense of universality, in ethical value judgments is due to several conditions. As Aristotle pointed out, one must not expect more exactitude than the subject-matter is capable of. The subject-matter of ethical values is very complex. Man is the most complex of all finite dynamic and plastic centers. Man the individual is, of all beings, the most needful of communal or group life. "He who could live without friends must be either a beast or a God." In the third place, man is the most sensitive and plastically responsive of all beings to stimulation from without. He cannot get along at all without his fellows, and he does not always get along well with them. Ethical value judgments originate in the *mores*. The *mores* are shaped by the urgencies of need and appetite, stimulus and response, to the complex environments of nature (inclusive of climate, soil, plants, and animals); of his own group and other human groups; and also to what he believes in regard to his own relation to the superhuman. Ethical values are the values regulative of personality-in-community. Religious values are ethical values raised to the highest conceivable power, and regarded as having a superhuman source or sources. Religion is faith in the conservation and augmentation of values. If there be a specific religious value, it consists of worshipful communion with a superhuman ground and guarantor of values; but the contents of this ground are projected into the cosmos from man's own vision of the fullest and richest personal values he can conceive. "Unless he can above himself erect himself, how poor a thing is man." To ask whether ethics and religion are primarily social or primarily personal is to set up a false antithesis. They are both at the same time. For the prime condition of personal self-realization is the group culture. On the other hand, the group culture is enriched by the contributions of spiritual genius. Prophetic religion, creative religion, is the transcendence by the creative ethical genius of the established *mores* effective in the group. The religious genius is one who is on fire with the vision of nobler personal values. There is an ever-

recurring dialectic between the socially current values and the heaven-storming insights of the ethical prophet who reveals to the members of the group higher possibilities of personal values.

Social culture, in its totality, is the resultant expression of, and instrument for, man's unceasing effort to realize and enjoy richer and more harmonious values. From this conception of man's nature as essentially an intrinsic value-striving, end-seeking being, springs the contrast between physical science and history. History is the moving scene of man's value-seeking activities. His social institutions are instruments for the fulfillment of values. A social-cultural group is a community of persons. It has a compound individuality, just in the degree that it is a spiritual community of persons. This spiritual community encompasses and molds the single individual. Every genuine culture-group is a sort of superpersonal 'personality'. Each one has its own unique qualities and values. Just as the human individual is the sentient, imaginative and reflective locus for the experiencing and fulfillment of values, so the social culture, in and through which the individual spirit fulfills itself, has its unique life-structure. The spirit of a culture then is a superpersonal reality, because in it alone individual persons live and move and have their being. Examples are Periclean Athens, the Hellenistic culture, the Apostolic Church, the Hellenized Church, the Medieval Synthesis, the Italian Renaissance, Calvinism, Lutheranism, Anglicanism, the Enlightenment, and the Naturalisms of today.

History is then, primarily, the study of these superpersonal spiritual wholes in their processionalality. Since man is primarily an historical, culture-conditioned being, history is the inclusive study of man. Physical anthropology, psychology, political science, and sociology, are hybrids when they are controlled by the methods of physical science; because physical science has no interest in the unique inwardness or intrinsicity, either of personal individuals or of spiritual communities. It is concerned only with the formulation of general laws of functional correlation. For it the individuals or a collection of individuals are nothing but the meeting points or exemplifications, in this particular moment of time at this point in space, of abstract laws of functional correlation. For physical science, an individual person, or a communal superperson, is nothing

but a configuration of event-particles in space-time. For history, individuality, whether in its personal form or in its compound forms of superpersonal communities, is an end-striving, value-seeking, superorganic whole. One simply cannot begin to understand the individuality of a person, a historical culture, a spiritual community, without the incessant exercise of *empathetic imagination*, enriched, expanded, and deepened, by the observation, analysis and sympathetic reconstruction projected into the object. This, I take it, is the element of truth in Bergson's doctrine of Intuition. I agree with Dilthey in the contrast he draws between explanatory (*erklärende*) and interpretative (*verstehende*) psychology. I also agree with the contrast which Rickert draws between mathematized physical science and history as *Kulturwissenschaft*. It is no valid criticism that there are partially historical sciences of nature—geology, paleontology, speculative cosmology, and, now, even speculative history of the chemical elements. Nor is it a valid objection to say that the individual cannot be an object of knowledge. The individual is known primarily by empathy; but individuals have common natures and capacities differing only in degree. In their value-seeking activities they share in and develop their common nature as spirits through membership in systems of social culture. Consequently our next question is this: What are the factors involved in the formation and mutations of systems of social culture regarded as the domestic shelters and nurturers of values?

V. THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL VALUES

The question whether there are universal ethical values reduces itself to the question whether there is an ideal typology of conduct. The answer to this question is much more difficult than the formation of a typology of thought or even of nature outside man, because the factors involved are so much more complex and variable. We have not only the qualitative complexity of human impulses and other capacities; but the endless quantitative variations due to man's plasticity as it is played upon in all sorts of ways by physical conditions, but *especially* by the regulative, the repressive and the stimulating influence of the various *forms of social culture*. Since man is unsocially sociable, there are all sorts of imperfections in the actual working of systems of culture. Since he is always seek-

ing more satisfactory goods, the master key to the interpretation of any social culture, in the pluralistic and changing cultures which constitute the historical processes of humanity, is found in the determination of the *ruling values or goods* which are recognized as dominating the given culture-system. Since the records are so fragmentary in regard to earlier cultures, and so complex in regard to the more recent, and the interpreter must endeavor to enlarge his power of empathetic insight, there is always a large factor of uncertainty in regard to the development of cultures.

Moreover, so far as one can see, contingent factors play a large rôle in any historical process. These contingent factors may have determinate conditions, but we do not know much about their origins. There are, first, the contingent factors of the physical environment, *the brute given* which conditions the emergence and career of a culture.

Doubtless the environments in central and hither Asia, the Aegean, the Nile Valley, and the Hellenic mainland, had determinate physical causes, but, for the aboriginal peoples who either emerged or wandered there, these were brute givens, just as the native endowments of the peoples were given potencies.

As Toynbee puts it, there are the stimuli of too hard countries, the stimuli of too soft countries, and the stimuli of countries that call for organized coöperative response, which, when made, yield fruit sufficient for the accumulation of a social heritage. Then of course, there is the shift of physical conditions which may paralyse or even wipe out a culture, as in central Asia north of the Himalayas. Why did the Mayan culture decay? Was it because of internecine conflict, invasions from without, as in the Inca-Peru, or from too much moisture, or from pestilence? Last summer I visited Frijoles Canyon and adjacent cliff-buildings near the Rio Grande Valley. From the pottery, *et cetera*, one concluded that the settlers had a degenerate form of the Mesa-Verde culture. Dr. Douglass, from the study of tree rings, has concluded that there was a prolonged drought of about twenty-five years, at the end of the thirteenth century. There being no streams or ponds on Mesa-Verde and the rocks being very porous, apparently the Mesa-Verdians were driven down to canyons where there was living water but much less cultivable land.

The second contingent factor in the mutations of culture is that of the appearance or non-appearance of creative leaders, inventors, organizers, in critical times. We cannot account for these factors. The time must fit the culture-hero and the hero must fit the time, if he is to be a hero. For, as Nicolai Hartmann puts it, "The genius who speaks before his time does not speak to his time". Suppose, for example that Plato and Aristotle had been Pericleans, or that Nicias had been a military genius like Alexander. Suppose that Jesus and his disciples had not appeared until Mithraism was more firmly seated, or not until the Goths had destroyed the Western Empire. Suppose Alexander had lived to be an old man. The course of Western culture might have been very different.

The third contingent factor is the impact of cultures on one another. The contacts and cross-fertilizations of cultures are mighty factors in the historic process. Contrast the incessant contacts between Mesopotamia, the fertile crescent, the lands and islands of the Aegean, and the Nile Valley, with the relative isolation of pre-Incan and Incan cultures and Mayan cultures. For untold millennia, incessant cross-fertilizations of cultures went on around the eastern Mediterranean. Who were the Greek invaders who came down to the sunlit lands and picked up and held aloft, until it blazed high, the smoldering torch of the Minoan-Myceneans? Only the cocksure Aryan racialists know for certain.

VI. THE DIRECTIONS OF CULTURAL CHANGE

Can any specific temporal directions and containing stretches of time be charted for the secular careers of cultures? Spengler's theory of cultures as unique millennial organisms, mysteriously born, growing up, maturing, and passing to senility and death, I have not space-time to discuss. I will dismiss it as mythical.

The dialectic theories of cultural mutation deserve more serious consideration. The most noted are those of Hegel and Marx. Is there a dialectic in historic process? I think there is a sort of irregular zigzag dialectic traceable in the history of western culture; but it does not play nearly so large a rôle as Hegel and Marx make out. It is certainly not the unfolding, through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, of the world-spirit, until the whole process comes to a stable equilibrium in the Hegelian state, in which freedom is fully realized

through conscious harmony of the individual with the ethos of the Hegelian state. That is a myth, Hegel's version of the Prussian kingdom of heaven. There are three fundamental errors in Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit*. First, the identification of the "Real" with the "Rational" is false, even though the "Rational" be identified with the concrete logic of opposites or negativity in a system. Croce rightly criticizes Hegel for confusing distincts, opposites, and contradictions. They are all "others", but the "othering" is very different in the three cases. That large area of the actual which does not fit in with the triumphant march of the Idea through negativity and the synthesis of opposites, is either ignored or twisted in Hegel. Second, Hegel, starting from the sound premise that man becomes man truly only as a member of communities, arbitrarily makes the State the all-inclusive community of communities. Third, his conception of social morality leaves no room for the advancement of human insight and conduct through the prophetic contributions of creative moralists. The Hebrew prophets, Jesus, and Socrates, were all immoralists, if morality consists in harmony between the individual and the customary ethos of his culture. Moreover, while Hegel was right in holding that all aspects of a culture interplay, he overemphasized the degree of unity in the ethos of a people. The dialectic of individual and group, or the dialectic of group against group never ceases. It varies in intensity and range, but it never dies out. For, I repeat, man is unsocially sociable; and, as culture increases in the richness of its traits, the individual comes more and more to be the referent for different and often conflicting group-valuations.

Marx makes the moving spring of the dialectic the conflict between the cultural state with its ideology engendered in an established system of productive economic relations, and a new system of productive relations which demand a new complex of culture-patterns with a new ideology. So we have the great conflicts; for example—thesis, feudalism; antithesis, free capitalism; synthesis, complete financial capitalism; thesis, concentrated capitalism; antithesis, proletarianism; final synthesis, the classless society. Marx laid his finger on the weakest point of the Hegelian dialectic, Hegel's failure to recognize clearly the driving power of the economic factor and his consequent rationalization.

But again Marx oversimplifies. All the significant factors of social history cannot be derived from the struggle of economic factors. He overlooks the contingent vitality of individuality in the spirit of man. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, nor whither it goeth." One can hardly fit Socrates, Jesus, or Paul into the framework of dialectic materialism; nor do Leonardo da Vinci, Spinoza, Goethe, Wordsworth, Keats, free verse, surrealism, the Proustian or Joycean stream of consciousness fit in. Moreover, Marx's classless society is another millennial myth. An utterly classless society is impossible. Classes are made up of individuals, and individual differences cannot be suppressed. There is a saying current in Russia that the Bolsheviks abolished the three old classes and established seventeen new ones. The classes are classifications of individual differences. The only way to a democratic society is to keep these classifications fluid and functional, to aim at a society in which every individual has an opportunity to use his capacity for the common good, or, at least, not against it.

I have criticized the Marxian social philosophy as one-sided in its theory of social causation; as vague, as well as dogmatic, in its theory of social ends. Nevertheless, I think that a critical examination of the Marxian philosophy affords the most fruitful approach to the actual problems of social order. It has given us a new orientation and a partial interpretation of the actual situation that confronts us. I regret that lack of necessary leisure has prevented me from making a closer analysis of Marxianism the main topic of this address.³

A. J. Toynbee says that there have been twenty-one distinctive major cultures, of which twelve have entirely vanished. And today we are witnessing the swift merging of cultures, through the mechanization of all other cultures by the West-European-American culture. Vast Russia is technologically Americanizing herself. So is Turkey. China will do so. Mechanization will increase in India, Persia, hither Asia and Africa, as well as Latin America. Will technological mechanization best keep house with totalitarian-

³I mention four significant works: Sidney Hook, *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx* and *From Hegel to Marx*; Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*; and George H. Sabine, *History of Political Theory*.

ism? Or can liberal democracy survive and spread with the intensification and extension of mass-mechanicalism? *This is the basic dilemma of civilization today.* For, taken by and large, it is the increasing coexistence of socialized production with socially irresponsible capitalistic appropriation that is driving our technologically advanced nation-states, with almost the inevitability of Greek fate, towards either Fascism or Socialism, Russian style. Can we escape this dilemma, or shall we too be gored on its horns? The logic of events is moving relentlessly through our present conflicts and fumbblings.

VII. SOROKIN'S CULTURAL DYNAMICS

The most elaborately worked out, factually verified, and diagrammatically charted theory of social and cultural dynamics is that of P. Sorokin. He begins by defining a genuine large-scale Culture as a *logico-meaningful unity*, in contrast with a mere causal assemblage of discrete interacting culture-traits or elements. Sorokin bases his entire quantitative analysis of cultural fluctuations on a clearcut contrast between three permanent and ever recurring types of Ideologies or *Weltanschauungen*—the *Ideational*, the *Sensate* and the *Idealistic* or mixed type (with minor variations). He finds in history, by his elaborately assembled collections of weighted changes, fluctuations, but no cumulative progress.

The basic questions for Sorokin are these: given the main types of social culture, are there repeated oscillations of these types (with minor variations); do the oscillations recur over long stretches of time; and what variations appear in the repetitions?

In place of the opposition between the ideational and sensate cultures, I would put the contrast between transcendent or other-worldly and immanent or this-worldly cultures. I should regard the idealistic culture not as a mixed type, but as one which finds immanent in man the three levels of physical, biotic, and spiritual capacities; and therefore, finding the spiritual, as transcendent of the sensate, to be immanent in man, the spiritually immanent justifies, as a postulation based on spiritual values, the faith in superhuman spirit. In brief, that the sensate can be transformed by the spiritual, that man can never be satisfied with the husks of the sensate, is witness to the presence in man of a superhuman Cosmic

Spirit. If man is the offspring of the Cosmos, it is surely as plausible to believe that he is adjusting himself to a superhuman order when he scorns delights and lives laborious days for knowledge, beauty, duty, and love as when he is simply filling his belly or satisfying the cravings of his loins. Moreover, that the latter satisfactions, if made paramount, turn to dead-sea fruit and ashes, I am convinced.

An idealism of personal values is neither the echo of a disappearing supernaturalism nor an uneasy and transitory compromise between a transcendent supernaturalism and a wholly immanent humanism.

The statistical correlations in the fluctuations of sociocultural relations and values with social disturbances is too simplistic in Sorokin's treatment. I grant that he has shown that major social disturbances may quite generally occur in critical or transitional eras, with either "sociocultural" or valuational upswings or downswings, or admixtures of both; and that minor disturbances may be of incessant recurrence, say in five- or seven- or ten-year periods. Also that no law of these changes, either unilinear or dialectical, can be formulated. But it does not follow, as he seems to hold, that the historical fluxes and refluxes mean recurrence or oscillatory swings between *essentially the same general types* of ideational, idealistic, and sensate cultures, so that history repeats itself. I hold rather that a good case can be made out for the thesis that the modern development, with increasing acceleration of the empirico-scientific and technologico-economic relationships, means, as a Marxian would say, a radical transformation of quantity into quality. We are living in a period in which concentration of control, following on and accelerating the multiplication of machine production and distribution of all the means of living, means a *new* sociocultural climate; one in which such a radical transformation of sociocultural relations is involved that it can be affirmed that, more or less insensibly, our systems of sociopolitical relations and values are undergoing transformations so thorough as to justify one in maintaining that the transformations are more deep-going and pervasive than can be found in any previous critical transition recorded in Western Civilization.

If I am correct in this surmise (and I regret that I cannot here

elaborate my contention), then conclusions based on parallelisms between the immediate past and present and the succession of earlier transitional epochs are untrustworthy. Then we must recognize that we are living in a quite novel epoch in the history of civilization. And our philosophy of history must recognize, on the one hand, that analogies from the remoter past are invalid; and, on the other hand, that we must address ourselves to a critical analysis of our present situation. Light will be thrown on our situation by contrasting it with past critical epochs, but only obfuscation by assuming that the large-scale sociocultural patterns of the past are being reenacted today. History is repeating itself with such quantitative and qualitative differences that the statement that history is not repeating itself may be a larger partial truth than its contrary. I am firmly convinced that, in this new day, the study of the past offers more warnings than examples for us. This age is a radically novel emergent in the historic process. And not only of Western civilization. For Eastern cultures are being radically transformed by Western mechanicalism and science more than by Western morals or politics.

My criticism of Sorokin's method is that in it there is too much abstractionism, too much emphasis on unimportant resemblances in the secular recurrences of his cultural types, too little bringing out of the concrete differences between the ideational, the idealistic and the sensate cultures in the successive periods of Western history. In short, in Hegelian parlance, Sorokin falls for the fallacy of the abstract universal. His abstractionism is too denotative, the connotations are too superficial. He speaks of the immanent logic of culture, the inevitable tendency of a culture to generate its opposite; or at least to run to seed and so give place to its opposite. Thus he admits sociocultural dialectic. But he does not seem to find any place for advance, for progress, through the immanent dialectic. Apparently, for him all that the history of culture manifests is a series of irregular but pendular oscillations. He gives a most imposing array of tables of fluctuations in cultures, and of fluctuations in the constituent parts thereof: namely, the Arts, Philosophies, Science, Morals, Law, Political and other Social institutions, and Religion. These tables are interesting and suggestive, but they glide over the questions which I regard as foundational; namely, the quanti-

tative and qualitative *differences* between the ideational, idealistic, and sensate cultures of Greece, Rome, and Western Christendom. Such questions cannot be answered by tables. One must live one's self into the epochs of cultures in order to know their differences. The ideational culture of the earlier Middle Ages was not a repetition of that of Greece or Rome. Nor was the idealistic culture of the later Middle Ages a repetition of the Greek. Nor is the "overripe Sensate culture"⁴ of modern Western man a repetition of that of Rome or Greece. The differences may be more important than the resemblances. If they are, then there may be advances through the dialectic; and the present critical or transitional era may be, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, different from all earlier transitions. In place of eternal recurrences or oscillations there may have been progress, however tortuous and wavering its lines may be.

In sum, then, Sorokin's quantitative method does not go to the root of the matter. It does not clear up the respective rôles of intellectual and moral cultures and of economico-technological and politico-legal factors in the social fluctuations. How far are the ideological factors causes and how far effects? What are the relationships between quantitative and qualitative changes? Is our "overripe Sensate culture" dying because its economic efficiency is being paralysed? Or is it dying because its members are hungering and thirsting for a new supernatural revelation, a new birth of transcendental religion? What we need is a closer and more comprehensive analysis of the complex factors in our existing total situation, in which the qualitative influences of the increasing mechanization of life shall be *weighed* in their effects on the whole social *psyche*; in short, a more comprehensive and finer social psychology. There are many contributions to such a desideratum lying around in books and journals. What I have failed thus far to find is an adequate synthetic interpretation.

VIII. THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

Until very recently the idea of progress, in one form or another, was very generally entertained in western civilization—not in the

⁴Sorokin's name for it.

Orient. Before I comment briefly on the doctrines of progress I wish to remind you of the irrational and brutish factors in history.

Paul Tillich writes impressively of the Demonic in history.⁵ When one considers the wholesale cruelties, lusts, manias, obsessions, superstitions, that rage like all-consuming forest fires in the life of humanity, the afternoon-tea-party theories of progress of armchair philosophers, sociologists, and reformers (including some pacifists), seem ridiculous escapisms, fashioned by timid, bloodless and unimaginative spiritual eunuchs. Range over the hecatombic holocausts of sacrifices, from the Carthaginians and Aztecs, through the Romans and the Christians, Jews and Mohammedans, to the Hitlerites and the Stalinites; not to speak of the millions killed and maimed in so-called 'just' wars, wars of defence, wars of freedom. Consider the careers of Nero, Attila, Ivan the Terrible, the death of at least four million peasants during the liquidation of the Kulaks, as well as the unknown number of aristocrats and bourgeoisie "liquidated" in the Russian revolution. Consider the purges still going on in Germany and Russia, the lynchings in the U.S.A. Consider the manias of the Middle Ages, the witch-hunts of New England, and the present manias. The perusal of general history unfolds a gloomy tale of the insensate greeds, lusts, panic fears of mankind, of its insensibility to reason, its panicky mass suggestibility. The demonic in history is due to the unruly and brutal passions of irrational humanity. Nothing great in history has been achieved without immense passion, suffering, and waste. One thing, said Hegel, we learn from history—that mankind learns nothing from history. When we look over

wasted lands
Blight and famine, plague and earthquake,
roaring deeps and fiery sands
Changing fights, and flaming towns,
and sinking ships and praying hands,

Can we find any more in the process than

A music centred on a doleful song
Steaming up, a lamentation and
An ancient tale of wrong
Like a tale of little meaning though the words are strong?

⁵ In his thoughtful *Interpretation of History*.

The Belief in Progress.—In the roseate optimism of the eighteenth century generous spirits were fired by the vision of human perfectibility, of the possible endless progress of man towards complete and democratic self-fulfilment through the increase of knowledge and its spread. By education we could achieve thirty thousand Newtons.

In the nineteenth century there were two main sources of the belief in indefinite progress. One, the narrower in its influence, was the cosmic evolutionary law of progress from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, involving concomitant processes of differentiation and integration. This is the immanent Divine Providence of Evolution, the God in the Machine of Spencer. It is transformed into Alexander's Nisus, with more explicit recognition of the discontinuities in the pyramidal steps of evolution. Evolutionary optimism in regard to social progress furnished an intellectual sanction for the popular notion of progress, which was that, through technological improvement under the leadership of inventors, Major Generals of industry and Field Marshals of financial enterprise, the Western World was getting better every day in every way. The crude popular conception of progress was that it consists in the multiplication of means to satisfy the wants of the average human being, and to keep him from becoming satisfied, by stimulating his jaded appetites or arousing in him new ones. Incidental to the use of production and more mechanistic contrivances was the spread of literacy as well as of the franchise. Discerning leaders saw that, if the masses were to rule, they must be educated; but it never was made plain *how* the masses were to be educated. Certainly in the U.S. popular education was expected to be sociologically colorless, and not to attack the dogmas of *laissez faire* and self-interest as ruling motives, or of the possession of the means for conspicuous waste as the great prestige value. (Great enterprisers such as John D. Rockefeller, J. P. Morgan, and Henry Ford were, and still are, regarded as the high priests of the Evolutionary God of mechanical progress.)

Nevertheless, something went radically wrong. The World War came primarily as a product of conflict between economic-political groups. We went into the crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Now, twenty years after its close, the prospects for a

liberal, humane democratic civilization are darker than they ever have been in the half century since I was a freshman. A new colossus, half genius, half madman, bestrides all Europe west of Russia. Russia reeks with plots and counterplots, sabotage and purges. Spain is rent asunder. France is in the throes of incessant social conflict, trembling on the verge of the Fascist abyss. The British democracy is in retreat. Its prestige seems to be dying.

If liberal democracy is to be saved and go forward, it must be through the leadership of the United States and the youthful British Dominions and the lesser free countries. It is time to stop talking about mere ideologies. The fascist ideologies are arming to the teeth and successfully levying blackmail. If we accept the Hegelian idea of the state, then there is no place for liberty or democracy (which to me are two aspects of the same social principles). For then the state is the omniscient community—the Mortal God. It is above all morality and it negates the most elementary notion of universal human values. The state “has no determinate function in a larger community, but is itself the supreme community; the guardian of a whole moral world, but not a factor within an organised moral world”.⁶ It is hard to see how the state can commit theft or murder in the sense in which these are moral offences.

This absolutist conception of the State is to me the negation of all genuinely humane and universal morality. It is an abomination, and I challenge and deny it in the name of a universal human morality for which each one and every person is to be treated as an end-in-himself.

The Criterion of Progress.—The notion of endless progress is self-contradictory. If it means anything it means continuous approximation towards no goal. There can be no intelligent discussion of progress until one has defined one's criterion or criteria. For example, that there has been rapid progress in science and technology in modern times there is no doubt. Western man has learned to more and more successfully exploit nature. Whether he is not recklessly wasting natural resources is a debatable question. Man is learning to control diseases of clearly physico-chemical origin. Whether in our civilization mental socio-moral diseases are in-

⁶ Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, 325.

creasing or decreasing is a debatable question. Consequently it is an open question whether, on the whole, there has been progress. That modern man has failed to utilize his scientific interests and technology to make a more harmonious and generally satisfying social adjustment—to decrease unsociableness and increase sociality—is not open to question. Every morning-paper trumpets the fact.

What would be a better social adjustment? One might define it, *hedonically*, as an increase in the sum total of human happiness. But I do not think one could find any way to determine whether this has ever actually taken place, since the individual's happiness consists of the quotient that results from dividing his Means of Satisfaction by his Desires.

One may reduce one's unhappiness or increase one's happiness either by increasing one's numerator or by reducing one's denominator. So many indeterminate factors enter into the problem that no certain answer can be given.

I hold that the only criterion of social progress is this: A Society is progressing provided it is offering increase of opportunity for the harmonious fulfillment of the basic interests or capacities of human personality, in all its members. In this sense progress may be taking place. I think it has taken place by fits and starts. This alone is intrinsic progress. All other progressions—scientific, technological, and institutional—are simply instrumental to democratic personality-fulfillment. And, of course, if as Schopenhauer and certain Oriental and Western Mystics assert, personality is illusory, then progress is the *Sum Total of Maya*. This may be so, but if so, the Universe of Experience is but a nightmare; and how one can argue from a continuous nightmare to the possible peace of enlightenment in Nirvana I fail to understand.

To paraphrase Hegel, if there be any progressive meaning in history it is the progressive realization of personality. (I do not say of freedom because this is a weasel word.)

IX. THE HOUR OF DECISION

In general social terms, the present crisis in social culture is the conflict between the ever-growing and socially irresponsible concentration of the control of economic resources in a relatively

smaller number of groups (the increased power of the corporation), and the rising demand of the many for decent conditions of livelihood. It is, in simplest terms, the revolt of the masses against the increased concentration of socially irresponsible economic power. But this conflict is criss-crossed by the tremendous fact that the nation-state is the absolutely sovereign cultural and economic, as well as political, unit. What we are living through, is the recrudescence, on a powerful scale, of tribalistic nationalism struggling with the vision or dream of the effectuation of universally human values, which I take to be the ethical and cultural meaning of democracy. The first faint dawn of ethical democracy was heralded by the rise of political democracy. The ethical principles of democracy derived chiefly from two sources, which gradually fused together in the vicissitudes of European history to make one mighty stream. These two sources were: the rise, through the Stoic philosophy and the Roman law, of the recognition of a universal humanity, the empire of reason, in which by natural law, that is by the very nature of things, all men have a basic ethical equality. And the second great source, of course, was the Christian doctrine of the sacredness of human personality. These two conceptions, these two beliefs, fused together and underlay the medieval idea of the *universitas hominum*, the universal humanity with its twin expression in church and state. This conception of a basic universal humanity did not die out with the disintegration of the medieval ecclesiastical synthesis. It persisted as the doctrine of natural law and natural rights, and furnished the intellectual weapon of the first crusaders for liberty and democracy in the eighteenth century. Now, of course, it is very easy to pooh-pooh the unhistoricalness of this notion. I doubt whether even Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and the others, regarded the state of nature as more than a convenient fiction to aid in driving home the principles of universal humanity. In the nineteenth century, with a more adequate historical sense and an appreciation that rights exist only in a society, the best thought and practice were moving toward the notion of the ethical state in the democratic sense, and of the various states as members of the family of nations, with their relationships controlled by humane and reasonable international law. Then came the World War; and Wilson's dream of a League of Nations be-

came a crippled reality, now powerless before the recrudescence of tribalistic nationalisms arming to the teeth, spitting contempt upon all notions of a universal humanity and reaffirming the moral and economic irresponsibility of the God-state.

The recrudescence of tribalism on its present scale is a tremendous challenge to all who have any faith in the validity of universal human values, both to give a reason for the faith that is in them and to act upon that faith. We confront a major crisis in the history of culture.

I begin by repeating that the recognition of value inherent in the human individual as such, of the eminent dignity of human personality, clearly carries with it the affirmation that there are basic universal values. The denial of the intrinsic value of the human personality involves the rejection of any universally valid values. The denial of ethical democracy follows from any essentially aristocratic individualism such as that of Nietzsche, or Spengler's cheap version thereof. There follows the consequence that humanity is only a zoological species, not a moral species. For the sake of brevity I shall employ the term 'Fascism' to designate the totalitarian state. Now it is a curious paradox, which supports my contention, that aristocratic individualism is used in the philosophy of Fascism to justify the total subordination of the individual to the state. The Fascists' state in essence is based on the principle of hierarchy and leadership. The individual member of the state has no moral or spiritual sphere except such as may be permitted to him by a society organized in the state as a hierarchical order, with leadership and authority devolving downwards from the supremely great intuitive genius, the superman, or a few such. The leader is the incarnation here and now of the immortal, spiritual entity, Eternal Holy Germany, Immortal Rome, or Heaven-born Japan. I maintain that here we are confronted by an either-or which cannot be resolved by a dialectical synthesis. *We must choose between hierarchy and democracy.* Either we must submit supinely to the leader-principle, or we must elect to take *all* the risks, muddling, and messiness, involved in recognizing that ordinary human beings in association constitute the original source of sovereignty.

May I remind you of the social values of Fascism? It emphasizes

faith, obedience, and struggle, unflinching loyalty to a great common cause—the perpetuity and enrichment of the God-state. It assures to every individual a rôle however humble in the service of the Great Community. He is not a lonely individual, struggling for himself and his family in a confused mass of similarly struggling egotists. He is called to labor and self-sacrifice for a community in which economic ends are subordinated to cultural values. He does not need to join a labor union or fraternal organization in order to escape the loneliness which is hell. He does not need to become a 'joiner', for he is commanded from on high to be a participant in a great communal undertaking which spans the centuries and goes on from strength to strength through the united labors and sacrifices of the members of the succeeding generations. Thus he participates in a time-spanning life, and his own individual consciousness is suffused with a feeling of membership in a great community. The Fascist state is taking the place once occupied by the Christian church. It has its creed with its clarion call to devoted service in one communion and fellowship; it has its elaborate cultus, its rallying symbols, fasces or swastika; its hierarchical graded uniforms and vestments; its magnificent spectacles and sacraments; its teachers, prophets, and Popes. The Fascists' state is Allah, and Mussolini or Hitler is its Mohammed. Moreover, it does show an interest in, a care for, the common people oftentimes more thorough and consistent than in our own democracy. For example, I found that the seaside resort of Ostia supplied very cheap but excellent recreation and refreshment for the common people of Rome. By contrast, I traveled many miles along the beautiful coast of southern California and nowhere could I stop and take a bath or picnic luncheon without paying exorbitant prices, except on a few dirty, crowded, ill-kept, public beaches. When I was at Balestrand, one of the most magnificent spots on the Norwegian fiords, a German liner came in packed with people who were getting a two weeks' tour of the British Isles and Norway at a dollar and a half a day.

The Fascist argues that to deny the actual and irremediable inequality of men is to fly in the face of the facts; that, moreover, it is obvious that the more complex and technologically, economically and culturally interdependent become the parts of the modern state, the more insistent becomes the urgency for central-

ized control; since the more confused and incompetent become the minds of the mass as to the efficient methods of such control. Does it not then follow that unless the nation-state, which is the only effective form of sovereign political, economic, and cultural unity that we have, is to be resolved into anarchic confusion of warring egotists, the only sound method is to recognize frankly the principle of hierarchic subordination and leadership? Are not Mussolini and Hitler and their philosophical minions right? Is not democracy either just the affirmation of the caterwauling egotisms of the average sensual individuals or, when more than that, a mystical sentimentalism that flies in the face of actuality? Since there is no worthwhile freedom or opportunity for a civilized being outside the nation-state, what, concretely, can actual freedom and opportunity mean but leadership with hierarchy and subordination?

Moreover, the actual dictators have risen to leadership through the compact unity and vigor of the saving minority, plus the passive consent of the inert and bemused majority. That they have established a much greater degree of unity, security, order, guaranteed at least the means of subsistence, and a new sense of national greatness, there can be no question. In Italy, Socialists and other non-Fascists said to me, "Now, for the first time in years, all have an assurance of something to do and something to eat. Moreover, children and youth are no longer running wild; they manifest a new sense of discipline and order." Germans said the same thing.

It is true that the dictators have risen to power by suspending or violating the constitutions of their countries; it is true that they remain in power largely or partially through the ruthless use of force, the suppression of criticism, the disinfection of all foreign news, and the employment of propaganda for the purpose of conditioning the minds of their people from their very birth on a scale hitherto undreamed of. But Fascism is one answer to the terrific challenge of increasing social conflict and panic; and it is an answer made by the manipulation of the only sovereign form of social control that actually exists, namely, the nation-state. In this sense it is thoroughly realistic. But it is crowned with an idealistic mysticism that makes skilful use, not only of man's herdish propulsions, but also of man's readiness to work for and, if need

be, die for something far greater than himself. "Unless he can above himself erect himself, how poor a thing is man."

If democracy is to be more than a passing sentimental illusion, generated in the minds of Rousseau and a few other dreamers, it must find an answer to the Fascists' challenge. My first item in the answer is that social and ethical democracy never has existed, and does not yet exist. The first intimation of dawning democracy came towards the end of the eighteenth century. It was then believed that political democracy would be the effective instrument of social and ethical democracy. But this faith in the all-sufficiency of political democracy has been badly shattered by the rise, under the *laissez-faire* economy, of the new sovereign powers within the political state. I refer, of course, to the increasing concentration of economic controls made possible by the development of machine technology.

Democracy is, as yet, but the vision of richer human possibilities. I would rest the case for the possibility of social democracy on three arguments, in addition to the primary postulate that I have made of the intrinsic dignity of the human individual: first, the argument from empirical psychology; second, an argument from the logic of the situation; third, an argument from the historic emergence of new values.

First, the argument from empirical psychology is simply this. Humanity, notwithstanding all its queer variations, its twists and turnings, is not merely a distinct physiological species; it is a distinct psychical and spiritual species. There is a common psychical nature which is basic, which is fundamental to all basic differentiation. Students of the history of culture, anthropologists and travelers are able to understand members of the most varied cultures. Kipling was wrong when he said "East is East and West is West, And never the twain shall meet". I have communicated very profitably with Mexicans, Hindus, and Chinese; I hope they too have profited. One could pile up evidence on this score mountains high. I cannot forbear citing one striking instance. Dr. W. M. McGovern traveled up a remote tributary of the Amazon, was adopted as a member of a tribe. From his brother tribesmen he learned of a very primitive tribe further up who had neither husbandry nor

dwelling. He planned an expedition. Before the expedition started his brother tribesman, who was to be the leader of the fleet of canoes, said to him: "You must let me do the palavering at the villages on the way up, for you have no manners." Landing at a strange village was a very deliberate and ceremonious affair, requiring at least thirty minutes palavering. Dr. McGovern saw the point—the social utility of the palavering, which was a preventive of predatory raids and ensured hospitality. The expedition finally surrounded and stilled the fears of three members of this very primitive and shy tribe. They had blowguns and their abodes were heaps of leaves at the feet of trees. Their language was a series of metallic clicks. Dr. McGovern, a widely traveled and learned anthropologist who had been a Buddhist bonze in Tibet, wondered, "Are these beings really human?" He saw the shinbone of an animal with perforations in it. He pointed to it. One of the tribe picked it up and began to play on it. It was a flute. Then something occurred which made them laugh. "Then", said Dr. McGovern to himself, "they are human like myself; they have music and laughter." They had a society of family and tribal relationships; they had an ethos; they had beliefs in regard to nature; they had the rudiments of humane culture.

Second, logically, the assertion of the divine average is moonshine, since, when we have deducted all the scale of psychical inequalities, there is really nothing left that is human except a zoological and poverty-stricken concept of erect mammalian, featherless, tool-using, bipeds. This is the most harmful form of the fallacy of the abstract universal. The application of the formal principle of quantifying subsumption and distribution in the figures of the syllogism to the concrete world, leads to all sorts of errors. For example, to the error that, because physiologically man is a mechanism, he is nothing but a mechanism; or because self-preservation, hunger, and love are such powerful impulses in man as in other animals, man is therefore nothing but an animal; or because what all human beings have in common is so poor a set of capacities, man as man is nothing but this miserable, low-browed abstraction. It would follow, from the principle of the more extent, the less intent, that the wider and more diversified the denotative range of an anthropologist's knowledge of human

nature, the poorer its connotation. The summation of this fallacy is, of course, the abstract notion of being, which means nothing. The reverse is the truth. All real existence is determinate. Real existence is concrete, a plurality of varied and interrelated members. The concrete system of humanity, the concrete universal, is the living principle of concrete, psychical, and spiritual powers that pervades and manifests itself in the manifold diversities of human nature. St. Paul's words, "There are diversities of gifts but the same spirit", are the most profound anthropological and philosophic truth that I know. Now, important though the differential variations be, they have meaning only as possible coöperant variations of the same fundamental powers. So we come back to Burns' words, "A man's a man for a' that and for a' that", and I maintain he who denies this is either an idiot or a superegotist. The common human nature is basic to all the differences, and even the dictator can keep his seat only by making all sorts of appeals to this human nature.

Third, the historic argument for democracy is that it, and not Fascism, is the newest emergent. Sparta was a Fascist state; it lasted several hundred years. When it perished it left only memories of Spartan discipline, courage, and narrow-mindedness. Athens was partially a democracy and consider what it has left us. We must take a long view of the development of human cultures. When we do, we find long stretches of prehistoric human life concerning which we make various conjectures from stone and bone implements, cave drawings and potsherds. Then we come into the dim light of recorded history. Even here we find long stretches of time concerning which we can make only vague conjectures. For example, what was going on during the period of incubation from the decline of the Minoan culture of Crete to the apparently sudden emergence of classic Greek culture? There we find a breathless, rapid, creative upswing; then the spread of Greek culture with political decline, and its mergence in the Roman Empire, which becomes the great agency in the diffusion of Hellenistic culture. In the Roman Empire takes place the synthesis of Hebrew-Christian pathos with Hellenic intellectualism. Then comes political decline and rebuilding; the Dark Ages, followed by the Medieval synthesis; then the emergence of the modern nation-

state, modern science, and technology; and now, the first faint flush of the dawn of democracy. But the clouds gather and storms arise, from the heedless manipulation of man's creative discoveries in science and technology, by the forces of greed; but little checked, by the inertia of the untaught masses, due to the failure of mere political democracy to diffuse in widest commonalty a high-powered social intelligence. Tribalistic nationalism arises once more as a means of riding the storm. It will not last; it cannot last. There must come a new synthesis, a redefinition of democracy, the effective recognition that democracy does not imply a multitude of short-term elective representatives, judges, and administrators, incompetent to administer the complexities of our great society; and that the 'pork barrel' is not an essential attribute of democracy. We must recognize the need of expert diversity and inequality of powers and responsibilities. We must recognize the urgent need both of decent living conditions and of the diffusion of social-minded intelligence, so that the mass of the people are able to see the need of simplifying and centering responsibilities in fewer expert hands while holding the executives responsible to the sovereign people. In short, the criticisms of the totalitarians must be taken to heart. They are a challenging object-lesson. We must learn from them. They preach to us in stentorian tones the urgent necessity of the more equitable diffusion of the economic conditions of social well-being and of an educational system in which there is a career open for every social talent. Our educational system has woefully fallen short, primarily from economic causes and general ignorance with respect to the tremendous impact on the emerging democracy of revolutionary economic changes, which have insidiously blasted the promise of our traditional democracy. Democracy will not fully emerge without a social intelligence and will to preserve it, *through radically modifying its structure*. But, in the new synthesis, one principle must not be surrendered, that of the sovereignty of the people. What is the alternative? It is the seizure of the instruments of power by self-selected egotists who, to satisfy their craving to rule, would sacrifice the eminent dignity of the common human person to the Juggernaut car in which rides a highly painted and imposing idol, the immortal God-state—the Eternal Nordic Germany, the Immortal Italy, the Heaven-born

Japan. Having ridden to power and holding it as the prophets of this idol, the dictators must either keep up their propaganda of worship and expansion or lose their heads. They are the prisoners of their own propaganda.

But we must beware lest the bewildered mass of human nature, distracted by incessant social conflicts, fears, and economic insecurity, runs in panic to a self-proclaimed Messiah. *The only remedy that I can see is to let in more light, the light of a democratic social intelligence.* There is great danger. Democracy is emerging in one of the most momentous secular crises in the history of culture. On us teachers falls, I think, a heavy share of the burden of democracy. If the confusion continues, and some rabble-rouser, greedy for power, arises, we may all be either shut up or shot. If you think this is unduly alarming, consider the case of Germany. We are primarily teachers, and our field offers peculiar opportunities for us to bear witness to our faith in civic and spiritual freedom, to be achieved only through coöperation for the equalization of opportunity and the diffusion of the light of social intelligence.

I do not undervalue the cool and unhurried satisfactions which come from the contemplative activity of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. These intellectual games are very pleasant, undistracting, and soothing. By contrast with them, the concrete world of humanity is stormy, confused, dirty, and troublesome. Is the philosopher then, and the pure scientist too, to shelter himself behind a wall from the storm of dust and sleet that sweeps by; is he, having seen a little clearer the issues, to refuse to return to the cave where his fellowmen take distorted images for the reality, because forsooth they will laugh at him and call him a brain-truster? If the teacher elect is to hide himself to avoid trouble, to escape from the storm and dust, then we may find ourselves "as on a darkening plain swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, Where ignorant armies clash by night". For a world of warring tribalists will have no use for the philosopher except as a temple slave to hymn the praises of the great idol of tribalistic nationalism.

At present the fate of universal democratic values hangs trembling in the balance. We in America still have a unique opportunity

and responsibility. We are powerful in resources and manpower. We have no entangling commitments. We have, though imperfectly, a strong democratic tradition. My plea is that we must make philosophy count for something as the pilot of life in the voyage through the stormy seas towards a universal democratic and humane civilization. Call this faith in universal democracy a moral aspiration, a mystic faith, if you wish. I shall not be insulted. It is to me the only faith worth fighting for. "Hold thou the good, define it well; For fear divine philosophy should push beyond her mark, and be procuress to the lords of hell."

If philosophers remain content to pursue the owlish habit of reflection only in the soft evening twilight of abstract speculation, they are in for a long and dreadful night. Civilization is poised on a razor edge over an abyss.

To say that we Americans have no responsibility and freedom of choice in this hour of decision is a counsel of cowardice and despair. We can either be quitters or we can throw all we have into the breach. We can select between humane values and barbarian disvalues. For myself I elect the *value* of possible universal dignity of the free human personality. I hold, with Fichte, that truth in the supreme issues of life involves a decision of will, a choice between good and evil. I believe that you and I and all of us are confronted with the challenge to choose whether we shall knuckle down to tyranny controlled by demonic powers or march forward with resolute wills towards the dawn of an earth of worthy and comradely persons—a world set free.

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LOGIC AND SOCIAL STUDIES¹

THE fact has often been remarked, sometimes with regret and sometimes with approbation, that philosophy in the nineteenth century severed that close association with the natural sciences which had been so important a part of the philosophical tradition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Regret was perhaps usually expressed by those whose philosophical interests were associated with an interest in mathematics and the exact sciences; approbation was more likely to be expressed by those who sensed in the change a broadening of philosophical interest toward social studies. Yet this latter judgment was itself a novelty, if one compares it with the outlook of Spinoza, who thought that his canons for interpreting a Biblical text were quite of a piece with the canons of scientific precision in any other subject. This tacit presumption of the unity of science, natural and social, would have been shared by practically any philosopher whose working life fell between the time of Spinoza and the French Revolution, with the possible exception of Kant. Reason, essentially the same everywhere, was believed to validate that majestic system of Natural Law, which was accepted as the clue to order everywhere, in astronomy and physics as well as in religion, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, and economics. In this there was, no doubt, an element of self-deception, for Reason in some of the rôles assigned to it had more in common with the Logos of Neo-Platonism or of Christian theology than with the method actually practiced by Newton, whom the age extolled and professed to imitate. Nevertheless, the philosophical tradition had been guided by the belief that scientific work in all its branches is an application of the same intellectual principles.

The emphasis changed in the nineteenth century. Under a variety of new names—historical sciences, moral sciences, sciences of culture, idiographical sciences, *Geisteswissenschaften*—it became the custom to seek for new methods, even for new principles of logical validity, peculiar to social studies and setting them apart from the other sciences. In part this was a result of the dogmatic materialism that came to dominate the methodology of the natural

¹ The presidential address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at Wesleyan University, December 29, 1938.

sciences, but it was mainly due to the belief that social studies themselves permit, or rather necessitate, a kind of "critique of historical reason" and the transcendental proof of a new set of synthetic *a priori* principles. It is to this belief, which played an important though often an unavowed part in philosophy after Kant, that I invite your attention. The subject, as I conceive it, falls into two parts. In its earlier stages the search for a special methodology in social studies was involved with the belief in a general law of social evolution or philosophy of history—in its popular forms called progress. The desire to find in logic itself the grounds for such a law, I believe, was a chief motive for the logic produced by Hegelian idealism. It eventuated in a reckless tampering with the principles of logical precision. In the second part of my paper I shall discuss a few peculiarities of subject-matter and method which have been attributed to social studies, and which have been held to imply that such studies require principles of validity not exemplified in other sciences. My purpose is to pose the question whether the older belief, that all science is of a piece, was not really the profounder truth. There is, of course, no question of restoring the system of natural law in its pristine and too ambitious grandeur. Doubtless there will be no new Age of Reason, but perhaps it is not too much to hope for a renewed belief in the essential unity of all science, whatever its subject-matter.

Among the ideas of good scientific method which the Age of Reason formulated for itself and which it believed that it was safely following, there were two that received approximately equal emphasis but which in fact had very unequal values. These were, first, the principle of analysis as the preliminary to every effective explanation and, second, the principle that the simple derivatives of analysis must be self-evidently true. These were the two elements of scientific explanation which Descartes combined in his classic theory of method: divide every problem into its simple parts and rely only upon the series of intuitions by which an irrefragable proof can be built up. The importance thus attached to analysis in assessing the value of evidence was quite as great as Descartes believed, but the reliance placed upon self-evidence was in fact misplaced. Yet it was just the hasty assumption, that what appeared to be clear and distinct must be also true, which gave to the system

of natural law its false security and its false appearance of universality. For every kind of proposition alike could wear the guise of self-evidence. Self-evident values, self-evident facts, self-evident implications, self-evident axioms could all claim an equal certainty, and the self-evidence which covered them all concealed the fundamental differences which a better analysis might have revealed. For at bottom self-evidence was a state of mind, a biographical property of system-makers, and not a logical property of the propositions or the systems of propositions that they constructed.

In the criticism which overtook the philosophy of the Enlightenment the fallacies of self-evidence were amply demonstrated. Curiously enough, however, analysis was supposed to have shared with it a common shipwreck; the analytic became the "merely analytic", with a shrug or an apology. Analysis "transforms the concrete into an abstract"; by it "the living thing is killed".² Hegel, like Goethe, believed that "building up is more instructive than tearing down. . . . Combining means more than separating; re-constructing more than on-looking". Thus "synthesis", from Kant on, became an honorific word. It was thought to be the name for something positive, as against the negations of destructive analysis, the symbol of a higher faculty or a higher type of reason, as against the analytic understanding, which had short-sightedly been identified with reason. By this higher faculty one apprehends *das geistige Band*, the spirit that maketh alive, the mystic bond that ties things together into wholes. Thus there arose in Germany the cult of "Spirit", imperfectly paraphrased by the English Hegelians as "organic unity" or the "concrete universal", and with this the determination to put this mystical entity into the service of a profounder metaphysic and a more penetrating insight into the realities of social, moral, and political phenomena. For in the light of this new enthusiasm for synthesis and continuity, it was believed that the higher faculty of reason could penetrate into the inward drive of things themselves (*der Gang der Sache selbst*), the principle of life and reality which alone, it was supposed, could make the *dissecta membra* of analysis truly intelligible. The Logos, freed from its association with the pedestrian understand-

² Hegel, *Logic* (Encyclopedia), tr. by Wallace, 79.

ing, was thus prepared to assume a magisterial rôle in the philosophy of the nineteenth century.

This was, however, a new rôle, quite different from the vision of eternal truth in the form of self-evident axioms. Reason was now to play the part of synthesizing principle, revealing and manifesting itself in the march of events, though itself eternal and unchangeable. Thus there came about one of the most extraordinary and yet one of the most characteristic traits of nineteenth-century mentality, its apotheosis of history. It was a new faith, replacing faith in the system of nature, that history and not the exact sciences reveals the concrete, the vital, the true, informing spiritual core of Being. The history of philosophy was to become literally philosophy itself, a progressive coming to self-consciousness of absolute thought and a way of supporting a philosophical conclusion beyond the ken of the deductive or the inductive operations of the understanding. Among followers of the social studies it produced the conviction, set down in hundreds of textbooks, that the eighteenth century by contrast had been "unhistorical". This judgment prevailed in the face of the fact that probably more was written about history during the Enlightenment than about any other subject whatsoever, and equally in defiance of the plain truth that the scholarly canons of textual precision and of respect for historical fact were an outgrowth of the same intellectual principles that were responsible for the ideal of accurate observation in science. In jurisprudence, in economics, indeed, in all branches of social studies, there arose the belief, or perhaps more properly the hope, that something called the "historical method" would yield an insight into social process denied to analysis and the method of systematic generalization. Behind this trust in the historical method was the belief, implied if not expressed, that there is some logical operation which once for all can plot the direction of historical process and demonstrate its necessity. The law of history, the schedule of necessary steps and stages of historical evolution, would thus become the major premise of every systematic social theory. These two principles—the historical law and the historical method—were to be at once the guiding hypotheses and the ultimate goals of social study. For this reason the philosophies of history produced by Comte and Hegel became

the supreme generalizations—or if one prefers Léon Brunschvicg's valuation, the "darling vices"—of nineteenth-century social philosophy.

One need only recall the case of John Stuart Mill to see how enlightening this idea of a universal social evolution appeared to candid and receptive minds at the mid-part of the century. In a passage of unwonted warmth in his *Autobiography* he enumerated the novel conclusions to which he had been led by his study of Comte and by such fragments of German philosophy as he had gathered from the "Coleridgians":

From these sources . . . I derived, among other ideas . . . these in particular: That the human mind has a certain order of possible progress, in which some things must precede others, an order which governments and public instructors can modify to some, but not to an unlimited extent: that all questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute, and that different stages of human progress not only *will* have, but *ought* to have, different institutions: that government is always either in the hands, or passing into the hands, of whatever is the strongest power in society, and that what this power is, does not depend on institutions, but institutions on it: that any general theory or philosophy of politics supposes a previous theory of human progress, and that this is the same thing with a philosophy of history.³

Of the collateral utilities which Mill or others may have derived from this belief that there is a natural order of development in human faculties and institutions nothing need be said. Perhaps the law of social evolution, like the belief in progress, was in the main a moral postulate, an expression of Messianic enthusiasm or of the ineradicable desire for spiritual consolation. Nevertheless, it was put forward as an intellectual principle. In some way it was to be proved that there is a normal order of social change for which a general rule can be given, such for example as Hegel's formula that history is progress in the consciousness of freedom. Or it was to be shown that there is a standard series of stages, in intellectual history and in institutional development, which, because it is standard, can be taken as a type for judging and explaining the history of particular sciences or the development of particular societies. Comte's law of the three stages is perhaps the most famous example of this kind of generalization. Within such

³ *Autobiography* (1873), 161 f.

a general framework juristic or political or economic analysis might operate, bringing to light the structural elements appropriate to each stage, but the analysis would be superseded if one cut into the historical series at a higher or a lower level. Thus analysis would always be subsidiary to the historical synthesis by which the order of stages must be apprehended. The question is, what sort of evidence, assessable by the ordinary rules for handling evidence, would have been adequate to support this sort of historical generalization.

So far as Comte and Mill are concerned, there seems little to say except that neither thinker ever really envisaged the difficulties inherent in this question. Both men were influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by certain presumptions about the long-run or prevailing causes of social change which descended to them from earlier believers in inevitable social progress such as Condorcet. These presumptions, if accepted as unquestionable, might be stated as a simple deductive argument. They were, first, that social progress, in morality and politics and economics, results directly from intellectual enlightenment and the advance of science, that is to say, from the knowledge of nature and of the conditions of human happiness. The second presumption was that the advance of knowledge is substantially a continuous and, at least in a condition of human freedom, an inevitable process, because it is the normal result of accumulating experience and an unimpeded exercise of human faculties. If these two propositions were accepted, the inference might be drawn that social improvement would go on indefinitely and inevitably, because the "certain order of possible progress" natural to the human mind would guarantee it. At the same time, however, it is unlikely that either Comte or Mill would have acknowledged the truth of these premises, baldly stated, because they would only have been plausible on the assumption of the crudest possible form of empiricism. Comte, as everyone knows, was an outspoken critic of a purely empirical theory of knowledge, and Mill had modified the inherited theories of his school to a degree difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, both men were probably influenced by the tacit assumption that knowledge grows always from more to more and in the long run will always

carry social improvement with it. In itself, however, this assumption was merely an act of faith.

If deductive argumentation fails, the possibility remains that a general law of social evolution might be supported by an empirical examination of human communities and a comparison of the orders in which institutions grew up in them. If such an examination, adequately conducted, showed that there were a normal succession of stages and periods—whether it were progressive, retrogressive, or neutral—no one, obviously, could argue the conclusion out of existence on logical grounds. The law would then be an inductive generalization, like the observation that there are normal phenomena of growth and decay in an individual organism—an analogy, by the way, that received quite unmerited weight in this sort of speculation. Comte no doubt believed that there was empirical evidence of this kind to make at least a *prima facie* case for his law of the three stages, though Mill appears to have been more skeptical about it. Viewed in this light, however, the law of the three stages was a very feeble generalization, as Comte's critics have generally agreed. It was avowedly based only on the development of Western Europe, neglecting the great Asiatic civilizations, and even in the case of Europe it rested on a highly subjective reading of history, which owed less to evidence than to moral aspiration. It is true that a generation of sociologists and anthropologists after Comte strove to remove this objection by widening the induction and by criticizing the preconceptions. Broadly speaking, however, the further they went the less certain Comte's generalization, or indeed any generalization, became. The pitfalls that lurked in the comparative study of social histories have been analysed so frequently and so destructively by later anthropologists that the method has probably today little or no scientific standing. The empirical evidence for a standard series of evolutionary stages in social history simply was not forthcoming. Mill himself always believed that the existence of historical laws would have to be supported by deduction from laws of mental development, but he had really nothing to suggest except obviously fallacious inferences from the association of ideas.

It may well be doubted whether Comte or any philosopher who

believed in a law of social evolution ever really contemplated it as merely a generalization from instances. Evidence of this sort hardly represented the genealogy of the idea. It depended rather upon an intuition of inherent historical "necessity", of internal propulsion residing in the natural development of the mind, and manifesting itself in the institutions and the civilizations which the mind was believed to produce. However much Comte or Mill might have scouted the suggestion, evolution in the sense in which they were looking for it implied a kind of historical vitalism, an internal principle of social growth. And any such principle would have to be, either avowedly or subterraneously, an increasing purpose running through the ages and binding them together by the progressive realization of an ideal. Such a philosophy of history had often been defended by Christian writers on the ground of a common religious inspiration or revelation. But what manner of evidence, deductive or empirical, could possibly be given for it? This evidence would have to reveal a sort of necessity determining unique historical process, occurring only once and never to be repeated. Indeed, the very individuality of the process would have to be regarded as the ground for the necessity of the order in which events occur. Evidence for the reality of such necessity would have to be found outside the events and the orders of events which alone the historian of society is able to observe. And if the word necessity were not grossly misused, the evidence would have to be some sort of *a priori* principle. In logic as understood by Comte and Mill there was not the slightest ground for such a presumption. In short, their philosophy of history was of such a nature that in principle they had no means for establishing its truth.

Herein lies the reason for the charge of superficiality which idealists of Hegelian antecedents continually brought against the naturalism of Comte, Mill, and Spencer. The argument, it is true, was not made to turn explicitly upon methodology, but the Hegelians were in fact chiefly concerned with religion, law, government, and economics. On the Continent the influence of the School was exerted almost exclusively upon these subjects, and especially upon the study of their history or upon the development of the historical method in them. In effect, Hegelian idealism was a special logic, providing the principles of a special method, meant to be

applicable in subjects where history forms a fundamental property of the subject-matter. It is therefore suitable to the study of civilization, the domain of the Spirit, in which synthesis, continuity, wholeness, are the properties that particularly need to be apprehended. These properties, it assumed, are radically incomprehensible to ordinary logic, which is controlled by analysis and dedicated to discreteness, atomism, and mechanism. Hegelian idealism, accordingly, was a kind of critique of social and historical reason. As Kant assumed the indubitable validity of Newtonian physics and set up the conditions upon which, as he supposed, such a body of truth could be justified, so idealism put its own construction upon social evolution and sought the principles to justify this. In the domain of Spirit, the beginning is logically implicated in the end. The ends successively achieved in social evolution validate and control the whole process. Thus there is a necessary order of stages in social development which becomes a surrogate for the self-evident truths in the older system of Natural Law; like them, it was supposed to guarantee the observations, the inferences, and above all the valuations, by which the details of social study were to be filled in. Perceiving, rightly enough, that no such tremendous synthesis could ever be supported upon ordinary rules of evidence, the idealists essayed nothing less than a reformation of logic to supply *a priori* the imagined necessities of the case.

In Hegel's terminology this new logic was described as the product of reason, as distinguished from the logic created by the lower faculty of understanding. In this higher logic the rules of ordinary formal inference are superseded in favor of the logic of dialectic. The need for this advance, as Hegel described it, is that the logic of the understanding can attribute to its objects only "fixed characters", while dialectic permits the fluidity of characters. Reason, unlike understanding, is able to deal with "life" and movement, for, as Hegel says, "reason is the soul of knowledge as life is the soul of things". Consequently a dialectical logic produced by reason is able to apprehend change, power, movement, because it includes the fruitful tension of opposites, which is the root of life and power.⁴ The terminology of English Hegelianism was different, because the language of a faculty-psychology did not

⁴ *Logic*, Wallace's trans., 143-150.

come naturally to Englishmen, but the thought was the same. Thus the general purpose of Bosanquet's *Logic* was to demonstrate the "Morphology of Knowledge" or the "concrete evolution of thought", in which judgment rises from those "one-sided" forms manifested in enumeration and measurement to those forms which can display the "real Ground: *i.e.*, the relation of part to part within an actual and systematic totality". The motive also was substantially like Hegel's, namely, the belief that there are subject-matters, marked by an inner connexity, in which a logic like Mill's is powerless.⁵ The ultimately valid logic is the logic of the "concrete universal", which alone can demonstrate the necessity of immanent connection and show the constitution of those real individualities in which the "whole" overlaps and determines the nature of the parts. In other words, the only genuine cases of necessity are those found in the teleological relation of part to whole, while the necessity of formal inference or inductive generalization is the false necessity of arrested logical development.

This whole line of argument is surely in the last degree suspect, if not wholly baseless. In the first place, it is an attempt to find in logic an *a priori* proof for what must be, if it is real at all, a substantive property of a certain subject-matter. Whatever may be the forms of connection found among social phenomena, logic must of course find the means for dealing with these kinds of relatedness. But logic can certainly produce no proof that a given sort of relation must be found there. This sort of argumentation is in reality nothing but an effort to distill a factual conclusion out of logical form. A general theory of evolution has first to be postulated as inevitable and then read into logic, as the dialectical development of categories, in order that it may come out again in the inherent connexity of the evolving products of culture. In the second place, the underlying reason for this modification of logic is itself baseless, *viz.*, the allegation that development, continuous change, motion, and "life" are incomprehensible if concepts have a fixed meaning. Surely, the notion that, in order to grasp fluidity, it is necessary that concepts should themselves be fluid, or that the

⁵ Cf. the remarks on Mill in the *Logic*, second edition, I, 142, and the remarks on history and science, 261 ff.

concept of change is itself changeable, is hardly better than picture-thinking. In the end the defense of developing categories, or evolving forms of judgment, amounts to a justification for using ambiguous terms, which usually shows itself in attributing an exaggerated importance to paradox. One thinks of the paradoxes of time, which have been as disastrous for the idealist treatment of history as for idealist metaphysics. What is there really to say about paradox except that it arises from a more or less systematic exploitation of a double standard of reference, and what can even a dialectician do about it except remove the ambiguities?

Finally, the project for reforming logic to validate a principle of necessary social development exacted a desperate price. This was nothing less than a modification or a mitigation, or, if some of Hegel's statements may be taken at their face value, the abandonment of the logical law of contradiction in favor of the relation of contrariety. For the dialectic was precisely a union of so-called contradictions in a moving equilibrium of opposites within a higher synthesis. Certainly, if contradiction is to be identified with "the very moving principle of the world", it cannot mean what contradiction means in logic. And if the opposed forces that control change in events must be literally reproduced in the rules that govern logical discourse, there is no escaping the conclusion that contradiction must "disappear" or be "superseded". It is true that the English idealists, having less faith than Hegel in dialectic, recoiled from the latter's willingness to use a root-and-branch method with contradiction. Bradley takes the line that formal contradiction is simply useless; the claims of the principle "are so absurdly feeble, it is itself so weak and perfectly inoffensive, that it cannot quarrel, for it has not a tooth with which to bite anyone".⁶ Bosanquet argues that, as one advances up the genealogical tree of judgment, the distinction between contraries and contradictions "disappears". "The tendency of the higher stages of knowledge is . . . to fuse contrariety and contradiction."⁷ In reality, however, there is only a verbal difference between superseding contradiction and abandoning it. The "fusion" of two

⁶ *Principles of Logic*, Bk. I, ch. v, § 15.

⁷ *Logic*, second edition, I, 296.

radically different logical relations covers the whole point. If this can happen, the law of non-contradiction disappears and with it the possibility of exact analysis and precise signification.

A change, such as this, ruthlessly carried through, would be as fatal to social studies as to all science. For obvious reasons, therefore, the idealist plan for a thorough-going revision of logic has not usually been accepted by later writers on the methodology of social studies. Nevertheless, in a weakened form, Hegel's distinction between the logic of understanding and that of reason was carried over into the distinction commonly drawn, especially by German scholars, between natural science and the sciences of culture, or the *Geisteswissenschaften*. This statement is probably not incorrect, even though men like Dilthey and Rickert, who chiefly made the distinction current, cannot properly be called Hegelians.⁸ It is quite true, of course, that there are important differences between the natural sciences, including biology, and those subjects which deal with the various aspects of human civilization. The question remains, however, whether the differences require a division of science into two distinct types. This question brings me to my second main point, the examination of some of the chief differences urged in behalf of such a division. More particularly I wish to call attention to certain forms of the distinction that seem to threaten the objectivity required if social studies are in any sense scientific.

There are two alleged peculiarities of social studies which I have selected, somewhat arbitrarily, for consideration. The first has to do with the observation of social fact, distinguishing so far as possible observation from interpretation. The point emphasized is the fact that in these subjects the observer seems to be peculiarly a part of that which he observes, and that the act of observation is consequently implicated with the events or objects observed, so that, as has often been asserted, the line of demarkation between the two is seriously blurred. The second point has to do with the interpretation of social processes. It arises from the fact that all the categories used in such interpretation are themselves products of the very processes which they are required to explain, so that

⁸ See Dilthey's estimate of the comparative values of Hegelian idealism and positivism, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, Bk. I, § iv; but compare his rejection of the philosophy of history, *ibid.*, §§ xv and xvi.

there is something approaching circularity in the explanation. Such social origins have often been held to be relevant to the truth or falsity of the theories. If it be granted that these are real and important aspects of social studies, do they imply tests of validity not used in other studies?

The peculiarity which is attributed to observation in the social studies depends upon a characteristic of the subject-matter which has there to be observed. This subject-matter is in the main the behavior of human beings, but not behavior quite in the psychologist's sense. It is rather behavior which has "meaning" (German *Sinn*), a certain significance both for the person whose behavior it is and, as part of a social situation, for the observer as well. Probably the word "meaning", as here used, is indefinable, but it can be illustrated. Thus a market, as this is known to an economist, presumes certain motives in buyers and sellers, a certain degree of knowledge, certain rational adjustments of means to ends, a certain liberty of action or restraints on liberty, and certain customary ways of transacting business. Or again, a religious observance, if not rational in the sense in which a trader's behavior is supposed to be, has at least a human intelligibility which is felt by the actor and can be comprehended (at least usually) by an observer. Geographical, physical, or biological conditions are of course factors in human behavior, but it is their human consequences that are of interest in economics, politics, or history. Broadly speaking, civilization is just that part of behavior which has a peculiar interest to the actors because they mean something by it, and because their fellows more or less understand it in the same way. It is the first business of the cultural anthropologist or the historian, or indeed of any observer, to grasp this meaning which men attach to their social behavior. Explain it how he will, and even though in his own life such behavior might be wholly senseless, he must first enter into it and apprehend it, as nearly as he can, in the way in which it was construed by those whose behavior it was.

It follows that observation in cases such as this requires a kind of imaginative or sympathetic comprehension. This need not mean a mystical power of intuition, though it has often been made to appear so. The insight upon which an observer has to rely in a

subject like history or anthropology is pretty closely akin to the sort of human understanding which enables him to carry on the intercourse of everyday affairs, for however much the methods of observation may be refined, in social studies the relation between an observer and his subject-matter is very like the relation between a man and his acquaintances. The behavior which he observes and describes has as its frame of reference the common meanings of the actors—their purposes, valuations, and customs—and this body of meanings, if not shared by the observer, must at least be apprehended by him and accepted as an adequate ground for the action. He has to depend on his ability to put himself in his subjects' place, to see the situation through their eyes, and thus to render their actions intelligible to him. He may go as far afield as he likes to look for explanatory theories, but whatever theory he adopts must at least be faithful to the action as it is for the actors, because that is precisely the datum which the theory has to explain. It is always possible that such apprehension will meet obstacles that it cannot surmount. At the limits, in dealing with remote cultures and unfamiliar practices, it is certain to do so. The expert historian or anthropologist, however, differs from the amateur observer largely in the kind of accuracy that he demands of himself; that is to say, in the extent to which he seeks to identify himself with, or "live himself into", the meanings internal to an alien culture.

If this be really the nature of observation in social studies, the conditions of successful observation are evidently to a large degree internal to the observer; it is the body of his own experience which enables him to enter into and comprehend the experiences of others. Writers who enjoy paradox have sometimes said, and not altogether falsely, that even a prejudice may become one of the conditions of observation. What is intended, I suppose, is that a certain bias or interest in the observer may render perceptible and significant a body of fact which to another interest or bias appears so insignificant as not to be worth reporting. And this is quite true. The English industrial revolution, for example, wears a pretty different aspect according as one approaches it with the "complacent pessimism" (as it has been called) of the classical economists, or with a lively sympathy for those whose prescriptive rights were extin-

guished by the passing of a non-capitalistic economy. The two descriptions, to be sure, need not be incompatible, because the facts in the one description may be as sound as those in the other. As history is written one bias has to offset another. For the subject-matter can be described only in the light of some estimate, conscious or unconscious, of what is interesting and important enough to be put into the description. Respect for fact and faithfulness to sources are indispensable parts of the social scientist's intellectual equipment, but they do not do away with the truth that observation in these subjects is shot through with human interest, from the interest of the actor himself, through that of the reporting sources, and down to the interest of the scholar who makes the last selection and draws the last inference.

So much, if it is an accurate account of observation in social studies, must be candidly admitted. But must the conclusion then be drawn that there is here a peculiar subjective kind of knowledge, in the words of a contemporary Hegelian, "a knowing in which there is no object independent of the subject", for which there is no canon of objectivity except the observer's moral responsibility to some body of higher human interests?⁹ Is there, in fact, any difference between a subjective kind of knowledge and no knowledge at all, since the vague notion of loyalty to higher human interests will hardly stand analysis if objectivity of observation does not? There is, I think, no way to defend the veridical quality of social studies, or of any study, except on the methodological principle that this alleged coalescence of subject and object does not take place, or in other words, that it remains possible to distinguish between the conditions of observation and the state of affairs that the observation reports. Where the two run together, evidence stops. Everything depends on how the interests, or even the prepossessions, of an observer in the social studies operate. They may possibly be conditions without which observations could not be made, the means of rendering visible the state of affairs which the observation professes to discern, and yet the report may be quite veridical. Or they may actually create the properties alleged

⁹ Fritz Medicus, "On the Objectivity of Historical Knowledge", in *Philosophy and History*, edited by Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (Oxford, 1936), 137.

to be discerned, or may so distort them that no reliance can be placed on the report. If the latter is true, and if the conditions of observation cannot be improved, there is no logical sleight-of-hand that will discriminate between truth and error. Obviously, in any subject a man may let his prepossessions color his observations; in short, he can make mistakes. In a given case it may not be possible to tell whether a mistake has been made or not. But unless it is possible in principle to discriminate between fact and error, there is neither fact nor error.

The supposed contrast between observation in social studies and in natural science is usually supported by a quite mythological representation of scientific observation. Writers who stress the contrast often speak as if sense-perception were a simple act of apprehension which has no conditions at all, or as if there were no cases in which these conditions distort or destroy the evidential value of the observation. But surely nothing can be more obvious than that observations which do not depend on physical, physiological, and psychological conditions simply cannot exist. Moreover, the total conditions of even the simplest observation must be indefinitely complex. Among these conditions some that play a large part in social studies would play a much smaller part, or perhaps no part, in the natural sciences, but this fact does not greatly alter the situation. In all cases the presence and the operation of the conditions that make observation possible is one thing; the veracity of the report is another. If this distinction is obliterated or too much blurred, evidence and artifact become indiscriminable, which is the same as saying that there is no evidence. The notion that there is some subjective kind of science in which this simple rule of logical relevance can be circumvented is really nonsense.

The other property of social studies mentioned above has to do with the curiously involved nature of all explanation or interpretation of social fact. It arises from the circumstance that social studies are themselves items in the history of the very societies they study. An economic theory is a normal part of an economy; political theory is itself a product of, or factor in, politics; an awareness of and concern with history is an invariable part of every social process that has a history. Hence there is a kind of circularity in

social studies. For what appears at any given time and place to be probable, or reasonable, or valid as explanation depends upon the prevailing "climate of opinion", and this itself has come to prevail in the course of a social history and as a consequence of whatever forces have brought that society to its present form. The currency of this idea and its development into a major instrument of criticism was due in the first place to Karl Marx, but it has now ingrained itself in the popular imagination and has greatly influenced the scholarly interpretation of the history of ideas.

For Marx the determination of social philosophies and social theories by the course of social history was a corollary of economic causation in the latter. The material conditions of production are objective and real; the world of ideas is a more or less remote reflection of it (*Schein* in Marx's Hegelian terminology). Hence his conception of "ideology", a word to which Marx gave a meaning so different from the then current usage that he may be said to have added it to our modern political vocabulary. It means the complex of valuations, moral rules, legal prescriptions, political dogmas, religious beliefs, and even scientific concepts, including the conflicts implicit in them, coupled with the implication that they are all bred of an underlying economic system. Ideology is a *falsches Bewusstsein*, reflecting the tactics and the successes or failures of the class-struggle, and hence is almost synonymous with the present bad sense of "rationalization"—a pseudo-explanation bred of prepossession and partisanship. With this concept Marx did pretty deadly execution on some of his economic opponents, and thus produced a type of criticism that has not ceased to be practiced. Moreover, his essays on current revolutionary movements in France were devoted to an analysis of the economic and social affiliations of the various factions, and the influence of these affiliations upon their purposes, tactics, and mentality—a phase of the matter which no present-day reporter would overlook in a similar case.

It is evident that this type of explanation and criticism need not be tied to the hypothesis that the effective causes of ideology are invariably economic. Any psychological condition that can masquerade as logical cogency will serve the same purpose. Thus the psychology of Freud, and indeed most kinds of psychology,

have been zealously used to show how symbols and rationalizations arise and how they simulate intellectual explanation, while having their roots in interests, organic drives, and concealed wishes. The constant use of this kind of criticism is today an outstanding feature even of the popular discussion of public questions. It is amazing to see how readily the implication is accepted that all social concepts, and all argumentation about social questions, are of course controlled, and the conclusions dictated, by ulterior motives, apparently with no perception of the fact that this position, if really generalized, would carry with it a complete debauchery of intelligence. At the same time similar kinds of explanation, on a limited scale, have been used suggestively—even though the results are rarely unquestionable—in various branches of social scholarship. One thinks of Lévy-Bruhl's anthropological theory of the evolution of logical categories, as between primitive and civilized peoples, or of the really enormous literature that has grown up around Max Weber's sociology of religion, and more specifically around his effort to show an intellectual affinity between capitalism and Calvinism, or of Ernst Troeltsch's even more ambitious effort to show that theology, moral ideas, and theories of church-government in all the Christian sects were correlated with the social and economic affiliations of the membership. In short, the conviction has become widespread, both among scholars and in the popular mind, that intellectual interpretation and explanation, or what at a given time is accepted as such, always stand in some intimate relationship to the internal stresses and strains of the society in which it takes place—to its social classes and their economic or other interests, or to the psychological biases that it induces in its members.

So important has this conclusion seemed that some scholars have magnified it into a new branch of social study, the sociology of knowledge. The name, so far as I know, was supplied by Max Scheler in *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (1926); the thing itself is perhaps most widely known in those papers of Karl Mannheim which were published in English two years ago under the title, *Ideology and Utopia*. So far as Mannheim at least was concerned, the sociology of knowledge was conceived upon the analogy of Weber's sociology of religion. As the latter had under-

taken to show that a religious creed—for example, Calvinism—with its accompanying moral valuations and rules of practice, is closely integrated with the rise and spread of a type of commercial practice—for example, capitalist enterprise—so Mannheim sets up the thesis that all social theories bear the traces of their origin in the social purposes of the class from which they arise. There is, however, a fundamental difference between Weber and Mannheim. For Weber the truth or falsehood of Calvinism was not in question. He never pretended that the association of Calvinist ethics with capitalism—assuming that his conclusion was well founded—could throw any light upon the truth of predestination, vocation, election, grace, or any other element of Calvinist theology. These questions were out of court before the inquiry started. Mannheim, on the contrary, has claimed precisely the reverse: namely, that knowledge in social studies is different in kind from other knowledge, that in social knowledge the origin of a theory partially determines whether it is true or false, and that the sociology of knowledge, among all the competing partisan answers to social questions, can somehow play the rôle of judge and arbiter.¹⁰ The substance of the claim is that the sociology of knowledge, functioning as a kind of superscience, can bring valuation within the scope of scientific truth. Considering the fate of other subjects which from time to time have essayed the rôle of superscience, one may perhaps doubt whether sociology is equipped to play so ambitious a part.

I have no desire whatever to underestimate the value of that type of historical research which shows that social theories are rooted in the social conditions that give rise to them. Even though this kind of explanation has often resulted in historical speculation that is impossible to verify, it has also served to offset uncritical dogmatism and, at the worst, a hypocritical pretense of disinterestedness such as no scholar can be certain of attaining. In particular, it can bring to light unconscious presumptions and hidden premises and can thus serve the ends of logical clarity. Nevertheless, this sort of study depends on the same canons of validity as all other research. If social theory in general is suspect because it is inseparable from the practical purposes and interests of those who produce it, the sociology of knowledge is suspect for the same reason. It

¹⁰ *Ideology and Utopia*, Part I, § 4.

is superstition to suppose that one branch of social study is in possession of some epistemological magic that enables it to sit in judgment on all the others. As a general principle, the doctrine that any social theory is validated or invalidated by the sociological conditions that produce it is as bad as the doctrine that theories are validated by their psychological antecedents. It is another case of the old and, one might have hoped, the exploded doctrine that logical relations hold good because human beings think about them.

As a principle of methodology, in social studies and in all other studies, it is indispensable to make a rigid distinction between two universes of discourse into which every theory simultaneously falls but which can never be dovetailed without utter logical confusion. It is true, and also important, that social theories live a twofold life and play a double rôle. They are beliefs, which arise in the course of human behavior and reflect the whole nexus of conditions, physical, psychological, and sociological, that play upon and affect human behavior. As such they are themselves existences or events, with psychological and sociological antecedents and consequents, and they may possibly be explained by whatever principles can be adduced to explain human behavior. But theories also consist of propositions that claim to be true or false, that may be postulated, or proved, or refuted. And the logical operations by which propositions are validated can never, without confusion, be identified with the mental or social conditions that make human beings believe them. A sociological theory like Max Weber's, asserting that Calvinist doctrines had a bearing on the spread of capitalist ethics, must be accepted or rejected on the historical evidence. But if anyone is still interested in asking whether Calvinist theology is true, he is bound to regard its historical antecedents or consequents as irrelevant, for if it is true at all, it is so no matter what made Calvinists believe it. Any theory no doubt does have psychological antecedents in human purposes, and sociological antecedents in political or economic situations, but these are never its validating grounds. For the truth of a theory depends not upon its antecedents or consequents but upon what it signifies or what it implies. This distinction is inseparable from all intelligible discourse, about social questions or anything else. The matter signified

and the person who signifies it have properly been called "mutually irreducible components" of such discourse.¹¹

These questions of methodology in the social studies are closely related to the development of recent philosophy. They all grow from a perception of the close integration of intelligence, and therefore of the sciences, with human interests manifested in behavior and consequently with social practices and institutions, and the history of such practices and institutions. For obvious reasons this relationship is most clearly perceptible in those studies that have as their subject-matter some phase of civilization, though in reality it holds of all knowledge. The problems which it raises are therefore general and cannot be solved satisfactorily by any presumption that social studies stand apart from other scientific enterprises, and least of all by the presumption that these studies call into play faculties not exemplified in the pursuit of natural science, or that their results can be validated by methodological practices which other branches of knowledge do not countenance. The investigation—psychological, sociological, and historical—of this relationship between knowledge and practice, between science and the social matrices in which science is conceived and from which it is born, is of the utmost interest and importance. That it will be actively prosecuted in the future, as it has begun to be in the recent past, is a foregone conclusion and also a thing to be desired. For such investigation may tell much about what manner of thing intelligence is and what part ideas play in human affairs. Yet in the interest of philosophical proportion and scientific caution it is worth insisting that conclusions touching matters of this sort, in so far as they have any historical or sociological foundation, depend upon the same principles of validity that guarantee the results of all other conclusions whatsoever. Any theory of method that by implication impugns the reliability of the great body of social knowledge, at the same time cuts the ground from under its own feet.

In this respect, moreover, there is no significant difference between social studies and any other kind of scholarly research,

¹¹ Charles W. Morris, *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*, 54 (*International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science*, I).

because the general logical principles of investigation are the same in every subject. This is true because there are certain universal conditions of rational discourse which have to be assumed and without which there is no reason for preferring one alleged explanation rather than another. Unless one may assume that observation is in general veridical, that hypotheses designate a state of affairs rather than the ulterior purposes of those who form them, and that they can be verified by deduction and further veridical observation, there is no such thing as evidence in social studies, any more than there would be in the natural sciences without the same assumptions. Wherever observation or reporting is attempted, and where the mere act of observing distorts the thing observed, there observation ceases to be revealing. Wherever explanation is attempted, and where it becomes in principle impossible to detect the influence of bias, there explanation becomes indistinguishable from fancy. Wherever a rational choice between rival explanations is attempted, and where the possibility of deduction, either by implication or probability, fails, there verification ceases to have any determinate meaning. When the limits of these operations are reached—and obviously in particular cases they may be reached in any subject—the limits of knowledge are reached too. There the historian, the economist, the anthropologist, and the student of government, like the natural scientist, has no word but *non possumus*; no conclusion is forthcoming. The vain hope that there is some epistemological trickery to circumvent this conclusion is in reality an invitation to sentimentality, to intellectual darkness, and in the end to barbarism.

GEORGE H. SABINE

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 1938

TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF OFFICERS

American Council of Learned Societies

The nineteenth annual meeting of the Council was held in New York City on January 28-30, 1938. The Association was represented by its delegates, C. J. Ducasse and S. P. Lamprecht. The acting Secretary represented the Association at the fourteenth annual conference of Secretaries of the Constituent Societies on January 27, and was also present at the meetings of the Council. The Conference of Secretaries considered legal problems connected with the incorporation of societies, the exchange between societies of their administrative documents, reports, programs, and other matters of mutual interest.

Professor Ducasse reported for the Association that the Bibliography of Philosophy, 1900-1930, was nearly completed, and expressed the hope that funds for its early publication could be secured.

Committees

Permanent Committee on Bibliography

The status of the Bibliography of Philosophy is as follows. Cards have been prepared both for the author-alphabetical-index volume and for the volume containing the index by classified subjects. Although not all the cards have been checked, the work of printing can be begun at any time. The checking of the cards for the first volume is practically completed now; the latest estimate is that Vol. I will contain some 60,000 titles instead of 70,000 as previously thought. For Vol. II the prospect is that entries will number 45,000 instead of 50,000. For this volume the periodical entries have been both checked and classified, and the book entries about half checked and classified. The checking and classification will be completed shortly.

Estimates for printing and binding one thousand copies of each of the two volumes have been obtained from several concerns. They ran upward of \$20,000. They were based, however, on the earlier and larger estimate of the number of entries. If the total number of entries is reduced as suggested above, the cost of printing and binding will also probably be reduced somewhat.

On October twenty-fifth the Committee on Bibliography, under instructions from the National Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association, made application to the American Council of Learned Societies for funds wherewith to publish the Bibliography, and the matter is now pending until the next meeting of the Council.

The Eastern Division at its last meeting voted that, in view of the coming eightieth birthday of John Dewey, the national Committee on Bibliography be requested to consider the possibility of bringing up to date Professors Schneider's and Thomas's bibliography of John Dewey's writings. The Committee approved of the plan, and found that Mr. Milton H. Thomas, Curator of the Columbiana Library of Columbia University, was willing

to undertake this work, Professor Schneider is willing to contribute a preface. The Committee recommended that a list of at least the principal works about Dewey to date be included. The possibility of publishing this bibliography was dependent upon the American Philosophical Association's making itself responsible for the purchase of 200 copies of it at \$3 a copy. The Board of Officers of the Association has recommended that the sum of \$600 for this purpose be appropriated by the several divisions in proportion to their membership. In the meantime the Board has guaranteed from the national treasury the sum of \$600 in so far as this is not appropriated by the divisions. No decision has yet been made by the Board of Officers as to the disposal of the 200 copies.

The Committee on Bibliography was this last year enlarged by addition to it of Professors W. P. Montague and H. W. Schneider, the Committee as so enlarged to be at once the standing committee of the Association on Bibliography and the point of contact between the Association and the International Bibliography of Philosophy, published by the *Institut International de Collaboration Philosophique*. The Committee accordingly calls to the attention of the Association the following facts:

The *Institut* was founded in 1937 under the patronage of the International Congresses of Philosophy. Its three major tasks are (a) publication of an annual International Bibliography of Philosophy, (b) the foundation of a center of documentation concerning philosophical work in progress, and (c) the arrangement of annual international conferences of philosophers. The bibliography published by the *Institut* is now in the second year of its existence. It is published in two fascicles per annum, appearing in March and September. The annual subscription is 200 francs, but through the generosity of Professors Montague and Adams the members of the American Philosophical Association can at present purchase the Bibliography at the reduced rate of \$3 a year. Last year 58 members of the Association took advantage of this subvention offered by the Montague-Adams fund.

The *Institut* is now about to undertake the gathering of a file of biographical and bibliographical information concerning persons working in philosophy and the projects on which they are engaged. To this end, questionnaires will shortly be distributed to the members of our Association.

The *Institut* also wishes to call to the attention of the Association the fact that at present the expenses of its central office are being met almost wholly from a grant made by the French Government. In view of the growing scope of the work of the *Institut*, however, additional resources are needed and are being solicited from the various countries. The American Philosophical Association, accordingly, is asked to consider the feasibility of making a yearly contribution.

For the Committee,

C. J. Ducasse, *Chairman*

Carus Lectures

The next series of Carus lectures is to be given by Professor E. B. McGilvary. Upon invitation of the Program Committee of the Eastern Division, the Board of Officers fixed the date of this series as December 1939, and the place as Columbia University. The proposal has been made that the three divisions of the Association meet jointly on this occasion.

Professor McGilvary has stated that in his lectures he will work out more fully some of the views he has been developing during the last few years.

For the Committee,

Edward L. Schaub, *Chairman*

Publication

Professor Gregory D. Walcott, General Editor of the *Source Books in the History of the Sciences*, reports as follows:

"Progress in furthering this series of publications is rather slow, but without any doubt sure. About the middle of the past year, a second impression of a thousand copies was made of the *Source Book in Astronomy* by Shapley and Howarth. The manuscript developed by Professor Mather for a *Source Book in Geology* is now in the hands of the publishers, and should be on the market as Volume IV of the series by next January or February. Several competent translators have been secured for the *Source Book in Botany*, so that considerable progress has been made this last year toward the completion of that manuscript. Dr. Alexander Weinstein has reported not a little advance in his investigations that will result in a *Source Book in Zoology*; and Professor Morris R. Cohen indicated several months ago that he was maturing his plans for the *Source Book in Ancient and Medieval Science*. The General Editor gets into touch from time to time with those who have immediate charge of the preparation of these manuscripts; but he refrains from hurrying them overmuch, since they are all busy men. The aim is to have the later volumes on a par with the earlier ones in the matter of excellence. Quality and not speed in publication is the guiding principle of the entire series."

The Committee wishes to add that the financial status of the *Source Books in the History of the Sciences* continues excellent. Two of the published volumes have already paid in royalties enough to cover all expenses incurred in their preparation; the third up to June 30, 1938, still had a deficit of \$923.30. This is counterbalanced, however, by interest of over \$2000 received from the Revolving Fund.

The Committee has received several applications for grants in aid of publication offered by the American Council of Learned Societies. One of these, from Professor Christopher B. Garnett, Jr., for his manuscript entitled *The Kantian Philosophy of Space and Its Predecessors*, has been recommended for a grant by the Committee, and the recommendation has been approved by the Council. Another has been refused, and the rest are still under consideration.

For the Committee,

John Herman Randall, Jr., *Chairman*

FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Year Ended December 31, 1938

Arthur E. Murphy, *Treasurer*
American Philosophical Association
Providence, R.I.

DEAR SIR:

In accordance with your instruction, we have examined the accounts and records of the American Philosophical Association for the year ended

December 31, 1938, and submit herewith statement of cash receipts and disbursements, by funds, for the period under examination.

Bank balances were verified by reference to bank statements and pass book.

Receipts and disbursements were verified by examination of cancelled checks and other data on file.

We hereby certify that in our opinion the attached statement of cash receipts, disbursements and cash balances is correct.

Respectfully submitted,

WARD FISHER & Co.

Certified Public Accountants

Providence, R.I.

January 11, 1939

	General Treasury	Revolving Fund for Publication	Montague Adams Fund
<i>Cash Balance, January 1, 1938</i>	\$ 678.95	\$10,073.65	\$ 0.00

Cash Receipts:

The Editors of *Contemporary American Philosophy*—Royalties and interest accumulated since June 30, 1930

			430.58
Eastern Division	273.22		
Western Division	119.89		
Pacific Division	54.27		
Royalties (McGraw-Hill Co.)		19.20	
Interest on bank deposits		149.71	
Total	<u>\$1,126.33</u>	<u>\$10,242.56</u>	<u>\$ 430.58</u>

Cash Disbursements:

Stenographic and clerical expense	\$ 25.47		
Audit 1937	10.00		
American Council of Learned Societies—Dues	25.00		
Printing and binding Volume XI— <i>Philosophical Review</i>	180.48		
Printing <i>Proceedings</i> , 1938	89.70		
Postage	4.98		\$ 5.00
E. A. Burtt—Expenses of Publication Committee	10.04		
George H. Sabine—Telegrams	1.13		
George H. Sabine—Telegrams and postage	4.06		
Translation and editorial work—Russell Olson		\$ 10.00	
Translation and editorial work—A. A. Woodford		75.00	

Translation <i>Source Book in Botany</i> —			
Mrs. Malcolm B. Davis, Jr.		178.97	
Translation <i>Source Book in Botany</i> —			
Charles C. Mish		6.00	
Printing circulars			10.00
Subsidy to Maurice Mandelbaum			84.08
Total disbursements	\$ 350.86	\$ 269.97	\$ 99.08
Balances, December 31, 1938	\$ 775.47	\$ 9,972.59	\$ 331.50

Recapitulation of Funds

General Treasury (R. I. Hospital Nat'l Bank, Checking Acct.)	\$ 775.47
Revolving Fund for Publication (R. I. Hospital Trust Co.—Part. Acct. No. 70787)	9,972.59
Montague-Adams Fund (Central National Bank, Middletown, Conn., Checking Account)	331.50
Total, all funds	\$11,079.56

Actions of the Board of Officers

Voted, to enlarge the Committee on Bibliography and make it the point of contact between the American Philosophical Association and the International Committee on Bibliography. W. P. Montague and H. W. Schneider were added to the Committee. Arrangement was made that Maurice Mandelbaum, American collaborator on the International Committee, should take over the work of transmitting subsidized subscriptions of members of the Association to the International Bibliography to the publisher, J. Vrin, in Paris.

Voted, to approve the recommendation of the Committee on Bibliography that the Dewey bibliography by Schneider and Thomas be brought up to date. The Board recommended a *pro rata* appropriation by the Divisions for the \$600 needed to assure publication, but undertook to guarantee this sum out of the National Association's treasury in case the contributions of the Divisions fall short.

Voted, that the Committee on Bibliography be empowered to apply to the American Council of Learned Societies for aid in publishing the Bibliography of Philosophy, with the understanding that no financial commitment of the Association is involved in this application.

Voted, that the next Carus Lectures, by E. B. McGilvary, be delivered at a Joint Meeting of the Divisions at Columbia University, in December, 1939, in conjunction with a special session honoring John Dewey.

The Board elected A. O. Lovejoy, Glenn R. Morrow, and H. D. Roelofs, to the Carus Lectures Committee. Their term expires in 1941.

The Chairman of the Board appointed Glenn R. Morrow delegate to the Council of Learned Societies (1939-42) and J. H. Randall, Jr., Chairman of the Publication Committee, and reappointed G. P. Adams a member of that committee for a four-year term.

R. P. Howes was appointed to represent the Association in the American Documentary Institute.

For the Board of Officers,
Arthur E. Murphy, *Secretary*

WESTERN DIVISION

President: J. W. Hudson

Vice-President: E. Jordan

Secretary-Treasurer: Charner Perry

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and H. O. Eaton and D. W. Gotschalk.

The thirty-ninth annual meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association was held at the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, on April 14, 15, and 16, 1938.

The following program was presented:

- The Notion of Perfection R. A. Tsanoff
 Liberalism and the Quantitative Conception of Happiness M. S. Everett
 Nature, Common Sense and Science E. Vivas
 Address of welcome by President A. C. Willard, University of Illinois
 Address on "Philosophy: Its Cause and Cure" by Professor J. W. Hudson
 Liberalism and the Sovereign State D. S. Robinson
 Discussion by R. McKeon, Charner Perry, J. W. Garner, A. C. Garnett,
 E. Jordan, J. A. Leighton.
 On Relations in General and Universals in Particular E. B. McGilvary
 Discussion by O. L. Reiser, V. C. Aldrich, B. Waters, H. Feigl, M. R.
 Cohen.
 Must Philosophers Disagree? (public lecture) J. W. Miller
 History as the Struggle for Social Values (presidential address)
 J. A. Leighton
 A Naturalistic Approach to Valuations R. W. Sellars
 Discussion by G. W. Beiswanger, H. O. Eaton, E. Vivas, H. N. Wieman,
 R. A. Tsanoff.

The following motions were seconded and passed:

That the Division approve the amendment of the Constitution of the American Philosophical Association by the addition to the first sentence of Paragraph 1 of Article III of the words "and a Secretary elected by the foregoing members for a three-year term and eligible for re-election", and the deletion of the fourth and fifth sentences of the same paragraph.

That a letter of condolence should be sent in the name of the Division to Mrs. Bonno Tapper.

That the following resolution be sent in the name of the Division to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull:

We, as members of the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, respectfully petition the President of the United States to remove the embargo on shipments of arms and military supplies to Spain under the so-called Neutrality Act. This embargo, in conjunction with the Non-Intervention pact, has operated in such a way as to shut off aid to the legally elected Spanish Government, whereas the Fascist powers have violated the non-intervention agreement, at first covertly and later openly, to assist

General Franco. There is no precedent in international law and diplomacy for such discrimination as the United States has, in effect, employed against a friendly power, and it is doubtful whether the Neutrality Act, as originally enacted, was intended to apply to a civil war. Furthermore, it has not been invoked in the case of the present conflict between Japan and China.

We feel that democracy is essential to the continuation of those cultural values which Western Civilization has so laboriously evolved during the past twenty-five centuries. If Franco and his allies win in Spain, there looms a serious possibility that there will soon be no more European philosophy or European culture worthy of the name. The threat to American philosophy and American culture, although more remote, is none the less genuine.

That the Division should coöperate with the Eastern Division in its next meeting, but should hold its 1939 meeting as usual.

That the officers be instructed to arrange for a meeting of the Division to discuss the rôle of philosophy in our institutions of the learning, and that a special committee be appointed to arrange the program of this meeting, and that this committee shall, if possible, be prepared to make recommendations as to the educational policies affecting the status of philosophy which the University of Illinois should support.

That we as a Division of Illinois should receive the thanks of the Division for its hospitality.

Professor Martin spoke briefly on the late Professor Tapper.

Professor D. S. Robinson presented a report for the Committee on Bibliography, and Professor Glenn R. Morrow presented a report for the Committee on Unemployment.

The following recommendations from the Executive Committee were received and accepted:

That the fortieth annual meeting should be held in 1939 at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

That the following new members be elected: George Abernethy, H. Bosley, S. S. S. Browne, G. H. Clark, M. R. Cohen, W. O. Doescher, L. W. Elder, W. Frankena, Raymond Gonso, P. Henle, C. T. Howell, R. McKeon, H. J. Nickels, F. B. Oxtoby, Edith Schipper, E. Tilley, W. Van der Lugt, W. Van Saun, H. Veatch, W. A. Wick, Frederic Will.

The following officers were elected: President, J. W. Hudson; Vice-President, E. Jordan; Secretary-Treasurer, Charner Perry; Members of the Executive Committee, H. O. Eaton and D. W. Gotshalk.

The following report of the Treasurer was approved:

Receipts

Balance on hand April 22, 1937	\$315.61
Annual dues	289.00
	<hr/>
	\$604.61

Disbursements

Cigars and cigarettes for Galesburg meeting	\$ 7.00
Division dues (1937) to national secretary	115.43
To C. W. Morris for clerical expenses	3.50
To Glenn R. Morrow, expenses of Committee on Unemployment	16.72

Stationery	10.90
Stamps	20.00
To Burgess Publishing Co., annual bulletin	136.64
Bank charges on out of town checks	3.55
	<hr/>
Total	313.74
Balance in bank, April 16, 1938	290.87
	<hr/>
Total	\$604.61

Alburey Castell, *Secretary-Treasurer*

PACIFIC DIVISION

President: E. O. Sisson

Vice-President: V. F. Lenzen

Secretary-Treasurer: Paul Marhenke

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and R. T. Flewelling *ex officio* for one year, H. C. Lanz (1939), Otis Lee (1939), F. R. Iredell (1940).

The fifteenth annual meeting was held at the University of California, Berkeley, California, on December 28, 29, 30, 1938. The following program was presented:

Social Philosophy	Alexander Meiklejohn
Nature vs. Spirit	J. W. Buckham
Philosophy as Religion	H. G. Townsend
The Arbitrary in Ethics	E. W. Hall
The Law of a Free People	Max Radin
The Concept of Responsibility—Ethico-Economic Implications	E. E. Erickson
Plato and Fascism	Melvin Rader
Probability and Induction	Hans Reichenbach
The Assumptions of Induction	William Savery
Neutral, Indubitable Sense-Data as the Starting Point for Theories of Perception	Lewis Hahn
Experience and Prediction	Donald Piatt
<i>The Presidential Address</i> —Three Windows into Reality	R. T. Flewelling
The Meaning of the Controversy over Meaning	Hugh Miller
Symbols and Symbolic Representation	J. A. Irving
On the Nature of Physical Space	F. Anderson

The annual business meeting was held on December 30 at 9:30 A.M. The Minutes of the 1937 meeting were approved as printed.

The treasurer's report was read and approved:

Receipts

Balance on hand November 27, 1937	\$417.80
Membership dues	136.00
	<hr/>
Total	\$553.80

Expenditures

A.P.A. Treasury	\$ 54.27
Smoker (1937)	5.74
Postage	13.15
Clerical assistance	2.25
Printing and mimeographing	30.69
<hr/>	
Total	\$106.10
Balance on hand December 27, 1938	\$447.70
Audited by Everett W. Hall	

On recommendation of the Executive Committee, the following were elected to membership in the Division: Prof. Cyril K. Gloyn, Prof. Heinrich Gomperz, Prof. Bertram E. Jessup, Dr. William T. Jones, Dr. Alexander P. Maslow, Prof. Hans Reichenbach, Dr. David Rynin, Prof. C. J. Sullivan, Dr. Stephen S. Tornay, to active, Dr. A. I. Melden, to associate membership.

The Executive Committee and the Division voted to accept the invitation of the University of Washington to hold the sixteenth annual meeting in Seattle.

The Executive Committee recommended the election to the Executive Committee for a term of two years of F. R. Iredell. He was unanimously elected.

The Executive Committee recommended the election of E. O. Sisson and V. F. Lenzen to the offices of President and Vice-President respectively. The Division instructed the Secretary to cast the ballot for these nominees.

The Division voted to assume its share of the sum of \$600.00 authorized by the Board of Officers for the purchase of 200 copies of a revised edition of Schneider's and Thomas's Bibliography of the Works of John Dewey.

The invitation of the Executive Committee of the Eastern Division to the Western and Pacific Divisions to join with the Eastern Division in a joint meeting at Columbia University in December 1939 was not accepted by the Division, inasmuch as a joint meeting would be inconsistent with a separate meeting of the Division at the same time in Seattle. However, the Division voted favorably on a motion to coöperate with the Eastern Division in all matters pertaining to the delivery of the Carus Lectures.

The Division voted favorably on a motion to instruct the Executive Committee to felicitate John Dewey on the occasion of his eightieth birthday in the name of the Division.

The Division adopted the following resolution: In order to express our sympathy with the victims of the anti-semitic policy of the German Government and to alleviate their suffering to the extent of our power, we pledge ourselves to raise by voluntary subscription the sum of at least \$500.00. This fund shall be used to aid the emigration from Germany of any person of Jewish race whose needs have been established to the satisfaction of the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association. The Division voted from its treasury the sum of \$100.00 for the purpose mentioned in this resolution.

The President appointed Messrs. Townsend and Miller to draft a resolution expressing the appreciation of the Division for the hospitality extended by the Department of Philosophy of the University of California.

Paul Marhenke, *Secretary-Treasurer*

EASTERN DIVISION

President: C. J. Ducasse

Vice-President: Herbert W. Schneider

Secretary-Treasurer: Cornelius Krusé

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and George H. Sabine *ex officio* for one year, John M. Warbeke (1939), Robert Scoon (1939), Albert G. A. Balz (1939), Paul Weiss (1940), Theodore M. Greene (1941), Otis H. Lee (1941).

The thirty-eighth annual meeting of the Eastern Division was held at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, on December 28, 29, and 30, 1938. The following program was presented:

Joint Session with the Association for Symbolic Logic:

Propositional Functions and Substitution for Function Variables

.....Henry S. Leonard

An Application of Symbolic Logic to Behavioristic Psychology

.....Frederic B. Fitch

Towards a General Strict LogicCharles A. Baylis

(Read by title)

Symbols, Signs, and SignalsC. J. Ducasse
(Presidential Address)

Scientific InterestRichard Hocking

The Concept of Value-BlindnessMaurice Mandelbaum

The Concept of Character in a Dictator-Ridden WorldA. A. Roback

Symposium: Historiography of Philosophy

Historiography of PhilosophyA. O. Lovejoy

Continuity and Change in HistorySterling P. Lamprecht

On Understanding the History of PhilosophyJ. H. Randall, Jr.

Conceptions of Dialectic:

Dialectic in Social and Historical InquirySidney Hook

Kierkegaard's Existential DialecticDavid F. Swenson

Kierkegaard and Classic PhilosophyJohn Wild

Presidential Address: Logic and Social StudiesGeorge H. Sabine

Aristotle and his Influence:

Diocles of Carystus—A New Pupil of AristotleWerner Jaeger

The Discovery of the SyllogismSir W. D. Ross

The Categories of AristotleIsaac Husik

Pragmatism and ActionOtis H. Lee

Peirce's Treatment of InductionThomas A. Goudge

The business meeting was held on Friday, December 30, at 1:45 P.M., President Sabine presiding. The minutes of the thirty-seventh annual meeting were approved as printed.

The following Treasurer's Report was read and approved:

Receipts:

Balance brought forward	\$2,999.76
Sale of Abstracts	5.30
Membership dues	803.68
Interest	54.05
Total	<u>\$3,862.79</u>

Expenditures:

Dues to National Association	\$ 108.25
Printing of Annual Proceedings	164.97
Expenses of Annual Meeting	122.10
Secretarial assistance and postage for Committee on Opportunities for Employment	40.50
Secretarial assistance for secretary	63.14
Postage	70.84
Printing, dues cards, announcements, etc.	16.85
Cable to Sir W. D. Ross	4.40
Total	<u>591.05</u>
Balance on hand	<u>\$3,271.74</u>

Sterling P. Lamprecht
Audited by Horace L. Friess

The Auditing Committee reported that the Treasurer's Report was examined and found correct. Professor Balz gave the following report for the Committee on Opportunities for Employment:

*Report of the Committee on Opportunities for Employment
of the Eastern Division*

Approximately 90 replies were received in response to your committee's letter of inquiry concerning conditions affecting employment in philosophy. Study of the replies suggest the existence of several widely prevailing trends. Many considerations affecting employment in philosophy-teaching were advanced by our respondents. The following statement seeks to give a condensed summary of the points made by the respondents. In addition, it supplies a brief description of two very general trends.

Conditions affecting employment, as suggested in the replies, may be summarized in the following nine statements. It will be clear that there are many interrelations between these points, and that they are of varying importance.

I

1. Depression conditions have made administrations susceptible to questions of numbers of students enrolled in departments of philosophy. Decrease of enrollment seriously affects junior positions.
2. Enrollment in philosophy is peculiarly subject to fluctuation with change of instructor, varying with the appeal or lack of appeal of the teacher.

3. Departments of Education are described as being especially depreciative of philosophy, and their influence is in general unfavorable.

4. The education of teachers of philosophy is often one-sided, with a consequent limitation of appeal of philosophy courses.

5. The teaching of philosophy is adversely affected by the fallacy of thinking that the College of Liberal Arts is an aggregation of specialties.

6. Depression conditions fostered the demand for vocational courses and programs of study; this fact, and the conviction that philosophy is remote from matters of livelihood, tended to reduce demand for work in philosophy.

7. In academic circles philosophy is either regarded amiably, but as inessential, or else it is viewed with actual hostility.

8. Administrations, particularly in institutions more directly affected by popular opinion, tend to follow momentary trends, with adverse effects upon philosophy departments.

9. There exists a growing tendency for other departments to provide, so to speak, their own philosophy courses, quite independently of the department of philosophy and its instructors. This seems to be especially noticeable with respect to the social sciences.

II

Two general tendencies affecting philosophy are suggested by the replies. The first concerns the position of philosophy with respect to degree requirements. The second has to do with the effects upon philosophy of the recent intensification of interest in, and the development of, social studies.

1. There has obtained a general movement to change philosophy from a status in which a course or courses in philosophy are required for the baccalaureate degree to a condition in which (a) philosophy is included within a group of courses from which one or more courses must be selected, or (b) philosophy has the status of an unqualifiedly free elective. The change to (a) seems marked. This may have the effect of reducing numbers. There appear to be, however, some compensatory factors. It is reported that philosophy attracts the superior students; that courses in philosophy are coming more and more to be regarded as substitutes for the so-called orientation courses; and again philosophy itself tends to be viewed as a peculiarly integrative subject. On the whole, the change of status may turn out to be helpful rather than the reverse.

2. The second trend appears to your committee the most important factor of all with respect to conditions of employment. This trend is connected with the increasing interest in the social sciences and the expansion in recent years of such departments.

On the surface, at least, the situation appears confused. Indeed, the replies seem contradictory. In many cases, it is reported, the social sciences are attracting students away from the study of philosophy. The demand for courses in social science necessitates augmentation of staff in the field. This, coupled with dwindling registration in philosophy courses, especially in view of depression conditions, tends not merely to check increase in philosophy staff but even leads to indefinite postponement of replacements. It will be understood that this appears more noticeably in institutions less stable in financial condition, less governed by academic tradition, and more susceptible to the influence of changing social attitudes.

Some respondents, acknowledging the trend toward social science, believe that this trend is due in part to conditions for which philosophy, or philosophers, are responsible. It is said that overemphasis upon symbolic logic tends to drive the student from philosophy towards the social sciences. It is urged repeatedly that philosophy teaching needs revision and change of attitude on the part of instructors. Instructors, it is alleged, too often regard the undergraduate as potentially a graduate student, with the result that undergraduate interest is killed. One of the consequences of these factors

may be a reinforcement of the tendency for departments, especially those in social science, to provide their own philosophy, as noted above. "Ideologies" and social "philosophies" are taken to be part of the subject-matter of social science. The consequence is that teaching of philosophy, in some measure, comes to be placed in the hands of men who are not primarily philosophers by training, interest, and attitude.

Certain points already cited seem to conflict with this description of trend. It will be recalled that some respondents report a growing tendency to regard philosophy as peculiarly integrative. It is asserted by several respondents that philosophy is more and more recommended by other departments as a collateral study. There is even a striking tendency to offer logic for freshmen, and to require an elementary course in philosophy as prerequisite for admission to professional schools. Most important of all, in some quarters it appears that the vogue of the social sciences is having an effect just the opposite of that described above—it is renewing and increasing interest in philosophy, especially with regard to courses that seem allied to social science.

This opposition or contradiction is probably more apparent than real. The effect of the social-science movement upon philosophy seems to follow a pattern. In the earlier phase of its development, interest in social science tends to diminish interest in philosophy. In various ways its influence is adverse. But in the course of a few years, the situation changes radically. A later phase follows, in which a renewed interest in philosophy is generated by the very development of the social sciences. Students demand integration. Institutions, and possibly sections of the country or types of institutions, at a given moment represent different stages in this process. If this be the case—and our information suggests it—the apparent conflict is largely removed. In general, our results seem to indicate that the development of social science will, in the long run, lead to enlarged demands upon philosophical teaching. This should imply increased opportunities for employment in philosophy. On the whole, the existing situation comprises many encouraging features.

(It is the understanding of the Committee of the Eastern Division that Professor Glenn R. Morrow, Committee of the Western Division, is in general accord with the above report of findings.)

Albert G. A. Balz

Professor Schneider read a report on behalf of the Committee on Bibliography. The Nominating Committee (W. P. Montague, Chairman, Harold A. Larrabee and C. I. Lewis) presented the following nominees: for President, C. J. Ducasse; for Vice-President, Herbert W. Schneider; for new members of the Executive Committee to serve for three years, Theodore M. Greene and Otis H. Lee. All were unanimously elected.

Professor A. E. Murphy was appointed by President Sabine as the new member of the Nominating Committee to serve for three years.

It was voted that the Committee on Opportunities for Employment be authorized to draw upon the treasury a sum up to fifty dollars, to be used at its discretion, for the purpose of making the experiment whether it can successfully function not only as a fact-finding committee on conditions affecting employment, but also as a committee attempting to place members of the Association in vacant positions.

On recommendation of the Executive Committee it was voted that the more liberal interpretation of the membership rules of the Division, so far as they relate to professional employment, be revived for the current year.

On recommendation of the Executive Committee the following applicants for membership were elected:

Active members: Dr. Harry S. Broudy, Prof. John L. Childs, Dr. C. West Churchman, Dr. Gladys Collins, Dr. Cecil Currie, Dr. Walter Eckstein, Prof. Harry N. Glick, Prof. Charles A. Hart, Dr. Albert W. Levi, Dr. Beryl H. Levy, Prof. Leroy E. Loemker, Prof. Louis J. A. Mercier, Prof. John M. Moore, Prof. Edward T. Ramsdell, Prof. Ignatius Smith, Dr. Herbert Spiegelberg, Dr. Friedrich Spiegelberg, Dr. Roland L. Warren.

Associate members: Mr. Donald C. Babcock, Miss Marie Copp, Mr. Charles W. Dobson, Mr. Morris D. Forkosch, Mr. Rubin Gotesky, Miss Adrienne Koch, Miss Frances H. Murphy, Mr. Ralph G. Ross.

On recommendation of the Executive Committee it was voted to accept the proposal of the National Board of Officers that Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution of the American Philosophical Association be amended as follows: "To the first sentence of Section 1 add, 'and a secretary elected by the foregoing members for a three year term and eligible for re-election'. Strike out sentences four and five of this section".

On recommendation of the Executive Committee the following resolution in honor of John Dewey, prepared by Professor Montague, and to be transmitted to the National Board of Officers, was adopted: "To John Dewey on the approach of his eightieth birthday we tender hearty congratulations; and as a token of our admiration and affection we ask him to accept and to retain for the duration of his life the title of Honorary President of the American Philosophical Association."

On recommendation of the Executive Committee it was voted that the Eastern Division assume its *pro rata* share of the cost of purchasing 200 copies of a Bibliography to be prepared by Professor Schneider in collaboration with Mr. Milton H. Thomas for the purpose of bringing up to date the Bibliography of John Dewey's writings. It was also voted that the Division recommend to the National Board of Officers that these 200 copies be distributed to a selected list of foreign libraries and to such American college libraries as, because of the exiguity of their resources, would probably be unable to buy a copy.

On recommendation of the Executive Committee and the Committee on Bibliography it was voted that the Eastern Division approve in principle the desirability of financial aid to the work of the *Institut International de Collaboration Philosophique*, and authorize the Committee on Bibliography to seek to obtain such aid from the American Council of Learned Societies, or from individuals.

The following resolution of protest against the persecution of minorities in Germany was adopted:

Resolved, that the following minute be adopted, and that copies thereof be transmitted to the President of the United States, and be given to the press:

The American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, desires to place on record its solemn protest against the repression and persecution of religious, philosophical, and racial minorities which, increasing for many years and in many nations, has during the past year reached a climax that not long since would have been thought impossible in civilized countries.

In the members of this Association the persecution of such minorities now practiced and officially defended in Germany gives rise in a peculiar degree to feelings of grief and dismay. For many of our members have received their professional training, in whole or in part, in the German universities, drawing thence the ideals of sound scholarship, of freedom of investigation and teaching, and bringing back with them a special affection for the people among whom the spirit of intellectual liberty, of government under the forms of law, of peaceful coöperation of men of all faiths, and of respect for the common reason of mankind, had found so many noble champions and exemplars. But in the present we see with sorrow the progressive suppression of freedom of thought and inquiry within and without the universities, the systematic use of violence for political ends, the public defense of cruelty, and the sedulous cultivation of hatred between men of differing beliefs or descent. That the spirit and ideals which once gained for Germany the honor and admiration of other peoples have suddenly become wholly extinct we are unable to believe. We wish therefore to express our sympathy with those of our own calling and of others in that country who are the victims of the existing reign of intolerance and violence, and our sense of the loss suffered by all men in the present forced withdrawal of so great a people from participation in the free and coöperative intellectual and cultural life of humanity.

On motion of Professor Friess the President was empowered to appoint a committee for the purpose of determining and giving whatever aid is possible to the emigration of German scholars in need of such aid. On motion of Miss Shearer it was voted to circularize the members of the Division with a view to suggesting that interested members pledge a yearly percentage of their salaries to contribute to a fund to be used in aid of German scholars. It was voted that the above-named committee be authorized to draw upon the Treasury a sum, not to exceed twenty-five dollars, for the purpose of such circularization, and that the committee be instructed to administer whatever funds would be made available by this appeal.

It was voted that the President be empowered to appoint three members of the Division, to join the three members now constituting the organizing committee of the proposed *Journal of the History of Ideas* (Professors A. O. Lovejoy, J. H. Randall, Jr., and Dr. Philip P. Wiener, secretary), for the purpose of serving in an advisory and consultative capacity in the attempt to explore the best ways and means of establishing the *Journal*, and in the formation of an editorial board and the framing of policies if the establishment of such a *Journal* is found practical. President Sabine announced the appointment of the following three members: Professors A. G. A. Balz, S. P. Lamprecht, and C. J. Ducasse.

A unanimous rising vote of thanks was extended to Wesleyan University and to its Department of Philosophy for their gracious hospitality.

By a rising vote the Secretary was instructed to include the following memorials in the minutes to be published in the annual *Proceedings*:

Professor William H. Squires died on January 7, 1937, after a brief illness. He graduated from Hamilton College in 1888 and returned as a member of the faculty in 1891 after a course of study in Auburn Theological Seminary and a year of study in Germany. Except for an interruption of two years for further study at the University of Leipzig he continued his thought-provoking teaching of philosophy at Hamilton College until the time of his retirement from active service in 1933. Through the force of his vigorous personality and his dynamic teaching he exerted a deep and

lasting influence upon the thought of many of his students. The breadth of his influence was greatly increased through his active participation in the work of unifying the educational administration of the State of New York during the first decade of this century. In addition to his regular duties as a teacher he gave freely of his time when called upon to preach, and he served for ten years as a special lecturer in teachers' institutes. In October 1903 he undertook the editing and publishing of *The Edwardian, a Quarterly Devoted to the History of Thought in America*. After the publication of the first volume, however, it was discontinued for lack of financial support. He will be remembered by many of his former students and colleagues as a "dynamic inspirer of thought". (J. W. Blyth)

In the passing from our membership of Sarah Harriet Brown the Association has sustained a genuine loss. The automobile accident which so tragically closed a most promising career took from our midst a woman whose keen, critical powers evoked our admiration, whose gay spirit refused to take life too seriously, whose vital, enthusiastic interest in her diligent quest for truth was contagious. Whether her function was that of reviewer, or writer, or speaker, or teacher, she challenged others to meet her on the high intellectual plane on which she moved.

It seems quite fitting that one who had achieved so vivid a personality as did Miss Brown should have been born in colorful Mexico City. Her school and college years were spent in Seattle. She received from the University of Washington the bachelor-of-arts and master-of-arts degrees, and from Radcliffe College the doctor-of-philosophy degree. She studied one year at Cambridge University before finishing her graduate work. Miss Brown began her teaching career at the University of Washington and then, in 1920, became a member of the department of philosophy and psychology at Wells College. There she served with distinction as a member of the college community, as a counselor in concerns of the faculty, and as a teacher.

Her conception of her function as a teacher of philosophy is indicated in her posthumous book *Philosophy*—edited by Professor Ivy Campbell Fisher and published as a memorial to Miss Brown by Wells College. This book provides a unique instrument for developing the critical and systematic powers of the student and for enabling him to philosophize rather than simply to learn about Greek philosophical views. The book is, furthermore, a real contribution to philosophical literature. Of especial value is its rigorous analysis of aspects of Platonic thought and its lucid translation of Platonic views into the modern idiom.

Those who knew Miss Brown best will realize how truly it has been said of her that her major interest in philosophy was *any* philosophy—so catholic was her love of wisdom—though perhaps one could say that the problems of logic and ethics occupied a primary place in her thought, if one were pressed to name definite disciplines. Today we sorrow not only for the personal loss that has come to some of us but also for the loss to all of us of those further contributions to the fields of ethics and logic that Miss Brown was so well equipped to make. Today we mourn the untimely passing of this ardent seeker after the perfect knowledge, this true philosopher who was pressing so effectively forward to the complete vision. (M. S. Harris)

Ernest Norton Henderson, long a familiar figure at conventions of the American Philosophical Association, of which he was a member for many years, was born in Illinois, December 17, 1869, and died in New York, March 4, 1938. He was a member of the faculty of Adelphi College continuously from 1903 until his retirement in 1935. Although his activity and interest centered increasingly in philosophy, he also taught education and psychology for many years, his best known work, *Principles of Education*, being largely a synthesis of the three fields. Professor Henderson received

his bachelor's and master's degrees from the University of California, and his degree of doctor of philosophy from Columbia University. He taught at the latter institution at various times, as well as at Ohio State University, the University of North Carolina, and Brooklyn College. During the World War he was a captain in the U. S. Sanitary Corps. He contributed to *Monroe's Cyclopaedia of Education*, *International Encyclopedia*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Psychology*, and *Scientific Methods*, *International Journal of Ethics*, *Psychological Bulletin*, *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, and *Psychological Review Monographs*. His fine, liberating influence upon many generations of students has been commemorated by the gift from his family of his private library to Adelphi College. (Theodore Brameld)

The American Philosophical Association sorrowfully records the death of the Right Reverend Monsignor Edward Aloysius Pace, which occurred on April 26, 1938, at Providence Hospital in Washington, D.C., after a period of invalidism of several years. At the time of his death Dr. Pace was Vice-Rector Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of the Catholic University of America. He was born at Starke, Florida, on July 3, 1861. He studied at St. Charles College, Ellicott City, Maryland, from which school he was graduated in 1880. Subsequently he studied philosophy and theology at the American College and the Propaganda, Rome. He was ordained in 1885 and received the degree of Doctor of Theology the same year. He served as rector of the cathedral in St. Augustine, Florida, from 1886 to 1888. Then he went to Europe to prepare himself for a teaching position at the new Catholic University in Washington. He matriculated at the University of Leipzig, where he studied under Wilhelm Wundt, and where he received his doctorate of philosophy in 1891. Besides, he followed courses at the University of Louvain and spent some time at the celebrated neurological clinic of J. M. Charcot at the Salpêtrière in Paris and acquainted himself with the theories of H. Bernheim at Nancy. In the fall of 1891 he began teaching philosophy and psychology at the Catholic University where he established a psychological laboratory. In 1895 he became dean of the School of Philosophy at that university. In addition to his doctoral dissertation, *Das Relativitätsprincip in Herbert Spencer's psychologischer Entwicklungslehre*, Professor Pace published papers on philosophy, psychology, and education in the *Catholic University Bulletin*, *Psychological Review*, *Philosophische Studien*, *The New Scholasticism*, and the *Catholic Educational Review*. He was associate editor of the two periodicals last mentioned, and also of the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, to which he contributed about thirty articles. The President of the United States appointed him a member of the National Advisory Committee on Education. He was honored with the papal decoration, *Pro Ecclesia et Pontifice*, and Pope Pius XI elevated him to the dignity of the Protonotary Apostolic. As a philosopher Dr. Pace must be included among the representatives of Neo-Scholasticism. As priest and scholar, as teacher, writer, and administrator, he exerted a wide influence in this country. Crowded classrooms gave ample evidence of his popularity and of the high estimate placed on his scholarship and ability by those who knew him. His students remember his stately demeanor, his charming manners, and his ready wit and humor. His colleagues mourn the loss of a friend and thinkers a man sincerely devoted to the cause of philosophy. (J. J. Rolbiecki)

It is with sincere sorrow that we record the death of William Alexander Hammond at Washington, D.C., on May 7, 1938. He was born at New Athens, Ohio, on May 20, 1861. He received the A.B. degree from Harvard University in 1885, and during the three years immediately following he was instructor in the Department of Classics of King's College, Canada. The next three years he spent in study in Germany and received the doctor's degree at the University of Leipzig in 1891. From 1892 until his retirement

in 1930, he was connected with the Sage School of Philosophy of Cornell University, first as instructor, then as assistant professor, and from 1908 as Sage Professor of Ancient Philosophy. During the years 1924-1930 he was co-editor of *The Philosophical Review* and consultant editor from 1930 until his death. In 1920 he was appointed Dean of the University Faculty, and in this office he rendered Cornell University distinguished service for ten years. An early study on *The Notion of Virtue in the Dialogues of Plato* was published in 1892 (Harvard Classical Studies, Vol. III). His translation of Aristotle's *Psychology* appeared in 1902, as did also the translation (with C. E. Bennett) of *The Characters of Theophrastus*. In his later years he devoted his energies primarily to the numerous duties of his administrative and editorial work. But after his retirement an appointment as Consultant in Philosophy at the Library of Congress gave him the opportunity to bring to completion and to publish his important *Bibliography of Aesthetics and of the Philosophy of the Fine Arts* (1933; revised edition, 1934). Professor Hammond was a charter member of this Association, a member of its Executive Committee from 1902 to 1905, and its delegate to the Council of Learned Societies from 1924 to 1935. In this latter capacity his services were so highly regarded that, at the expiration of his term of appointment as a delegate, the Council elected him a member of its Advisory Board. Professor Hammond was known to us all as an eminent scholar in the field of Greek thought. Those who had the privilege of a more intimate acquaintance with the man knew him also as a genial companion abundantly endowed with that rather rare possession—sound sense. (G. Watts Cunningham)

Arthur Lincoln Gillett, Professor of Philosophy of Religion in the Hartford Theological Seminary and Professor Emeritus since 1928, died September 9, 1938. He was born in Westfield, Massachusetts, son of Edward Bates Gillett and Lucy Douglas Fowler. He started life with a rich New England heritage. He received the A. B. degree from Amherst College in 1880 and graduated from the Hartford Theological Seminary in 1883. In 1884 Amherst conferred on him the A.M. degree, and in 1901 the D.D. After five years in the ministry he became instructor, associate professor, and professor in the Hartford Theological Seminary. He studied at the Universities of Berlin and of Tübingen.

His approach to religion was from the philosophical point of view. He was a mediator between traditional religion and the scientific and philosophical trends of our day. As editor of the *Hartford Seminary Record* and as author of numerous articles he helped many ministers and laymen to express their religious faith in modern terms.

For many years he was trustee of Smith College and of Amherst College. He was a member of the Prudential Committee of the American Board.

His students and colleagues remember his keen penetrative mind, his balanced judgment, his unfailing courtesy, his pithy and kindly humor, his deep-seated idealism, and his loyalty and devotion to duty. His marked quality was the spiritual integrity which characterized his personality and informed his mind. (Lewis Hodous)

The death of Henry Bradford Smith, November 14, 1938, brought to an end a life singly devoted to science; in particular to that most difficult branch of modern science, symbolic logic. To this work he brought a mind whose native power was trained by long study: after having received an A.B. ('03) and Ph.D. ('09) from the University of Pennsylvania, his interest in philosophy and mathematics led him to seek the instruction of chosen men at Harvard, Munich, and Paris. His first work as a teacher lay in mathematics; in which science he gave instruction at Tufts College, Carnegie Institute, Pittsburgh University, and the University of Pennsylvania. In 1916 he became a member of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, where he was a professor of philosophy from

1924 on. As visiting professor he lectured at the University of Delaware, the University of Washington, and at Bryn Mawr College. In addition to the American Philosophical Association, of which he was Vice-President in 1935, Professor Smith was a member of the Institut Artistique et Littéraire de France, the British Institute of Philosophy, the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, and various honorary societies.

His publications in general philosophy and in symbolic logic would make a long list; the last to appear were, *Science of Modality*, 1934; *Abstract Logic* (in new edition of *Logic*), 1938. It is hoped, however, that a study of the relations of Smith's logic to other systems that have recently appeared will shortly be published. If so, this work should go far to establish the originality and scope of Smith's conceptions in the domain of logic. (Edgar A. Singer)

Cornelius Krusé, *Secretary-Treasurer*

OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR 1939

(Addresses are given in the list of members)

Board of Officers:

J. W. Hudson, *Chairman*, C. J. Ducasse, E. O. Sisson.

C. M. Perry, Paul Marhenke, Cornelius Krusé, *Secretary*.

Delegates to the American Council of Learned Societies:

C. J. Ducasse (1940), Glenn R. Morrow (1942).

Committees:

Bibliography—

C. J. Ducasse, *Chairman*, W. P. Montague, D. W. Prall, D. S. Robinson, H. W. Schneider.

Carus Lectures—

E. L. Schaub, *Chairman*, H. B. Alexander, G. P. Adams (1939), C. J. Ducasse (1939), G. W. Cunningham (1939), A. O. Lovejoy (1941), Glenn R. Morrow (1941), H. D. Roelofs (1941).

Publication—

J. H. Randall, Jr., *Chairman* (1941), G. P. Adams (1942), W. K. Wright (1939), G. S. Brett (1940).

LIST OF MEMBERS

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